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VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 44 1999 NUMBER 5
Issues in the Third Circuit
ERISA-THE AWARDING OF INTEREST AS "OTHER APPROPRIATE
EQUITABLE RELIEF" UNDER ERISA: THE THIRD CIRCUIT
ENLARGES INTEREST RECOVERY IN FOTTA v. TRUSTEES
OF THE UNITED MINE WORKERS
"Ifjustice were immediate, there would never be an award of prejudgment interest. '
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1974, Congress enacted the Employment Retirement Income Se-
curity Act of 1974 (ERISA),2 which federalized laws governing privately
sponsored employee benefit plans. 3 Congress enacted ERISA to protect
1. Michael S. Knoll, A Primer on Prejudgment Interest, 75 TEx. L. Rv. 293, 294
(1996).
2. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974) (codified as amended in 29 U.S.C.
§§ 1001-1461 (1994) and in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
3. See HENRY H. PERrTr, JR., EMPLOYEE BENEFIT CLAIMS LAW AND PRAcrICE
§ 5.1 (1st ed. 1990) (discussing scope of ERISA); Dana M. Muir, ERISA Rmedies:
Chimera or Congressional Compromise?, 81 IowA L. REv. 1, 4-5 (1995) (describing
Congress' effort to codify ERISA). See generally Note, Pension Plans and the Rights of
the Retired Worker, 70 COLUM. L. REv. 909 (1970) (chronicling history regarding pre-
ERISA employee benefits law).
ERISA includes four titles. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1994). Title I estab-
lishes rules for the operation of employee benefit plans. See id. Title II articulates
the tax-qualification rules for qualified retirement plans. See id. Title III relates to
the federal government's administration and enforcement of ERISA. See id. Title
IV establishes plan termination insurance and creates the Pension Benefit Guar-
anty Corporation to administer the insurance. See id.
The Supreme Court articulated that "ERISA was enacted 'to promote the in-
terests of employees and their beneficiaries in employee benefit plans' and 'to
protect contractually defined benefits.'" Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch,
489 U.S. 101, 113 (1989) (quoting Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 90
(1983) and Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 148 (1985)). To
promote this end, Congress chose not to mandate particular benefits under ER-
ISA, but rather to govern the administration of employee benefit plans. See Shaw,
463 U.S. at 91. ERISA defines "employee benefit plan" to include both pension
and welfare plans. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(3).
ERISA defines an "employee pension benefit" plan as a plan that provides
retirement income to employees or results in a deferral of income by employees to
the termination of employment or beyond. See id. § 1002(2) (A). An "employee
welfare benefit" plan includes any program that provides benefits to employees for
(807)
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employees' rights to pension and welfare benefits and also to encourage
the development of the private pension and welfare benefit system without
excessively burdening it.4 To promote uniformity in pension plan admin-
contingencies such as illness, accident, disability, death or unemployment. See id.
§ 1002(1).
4. See Steven Davi, Note, To Tell the Truth: An Analysis of Fiduciary Disclosure
Duties and Employee Standing to Assert Claims Under ERISA, 10 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL
COMMENT. 625, 625-29 (1995) (exploring dual goals of Congress in enacting ER-
ISA); Matthew S. Rotenberg, Note, Fischer v. Philadelphia Electric Co.: The Third
Circuit "Seriously Considers" the Fiduciary Duty to Disclose Potential Changes to an Em-
ployee Benefit Plan Under ERISA, 42 VILL. L. REv. 1915, 1918-20 (1997) (discussing
purposes of ERISA). Congress expressly articulated its purpose in the following
manner:
[T]o protect ... the interest of participants in employee benefit plans
and their beneficiaries, by requiring the disclosure and reporting to par-
ticipants and beneficiaries of financial and other information with re-
spect thereto, by establishing standards of conduct, responsibility, and
obligation for fiduciaries of employee benefit plans, and by providing for
appropriate remedies, sanctions, and ready access to the Federal courts.
29 U.S.C. § 1001(b).
Congress enacted ERISA after 10 years of work on pension and employee ben-
efit issues. SeeJeffrey A. Brauch, The Danger of Ignoring Plain Meaning: Individual
Relief for Breach of Fiduciary Duty Under ERISA, 41 WAYNE L. REv. 1233, 1237-38
(1995) (explaining ERISA's background and legislative history). An impetus for
ERISA's enactment was the reality that many employees who had been promised
pensions were not, in fact, receiving them. See id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (a)). For
example, after the closing of a Studebaker plant in South Bend, Indiana, "4,000
employees between the ages of forty and fifty-nine with at least ten years of service,
and whose pensions had vested, received only fifteen cents on the dollar of their
accrued benefits." Id. at 1238. Commentators viewed this incident as the "pivotal
event in the history of the movement toward comprehensive federal regulation of
private pension plans." JOHN H. LANGBEIN & BRUCE A. WoLK, PENSION AND EM-
PLOYEE BENEFIT LAw 62 (2d ed. 1995).
Congress blamed plan fiduciaries for causing the failure by underfunding the
plans. See Brauch, supra, at 1238. Congress determined that federal action was
necessary to prevent fiduciary self-dealing, imprudent investing and misappropria-
tion of funds. See id.; see also 120 CONG. REc. 29,934 (1974) (statement of Sen.
Javits) ("The absence of any supervision over these funds and lack of minimum
standards to safeguard the interests of plan participants and beneficiaries has over
the years led to widespread complaints signaling the need for remedial legisla-
tion."); 120 CONG. REC. 29,949-50 (1974) (statement of Sen. Bentsen) (noting that
proposed law will prevent abuses caused by underfunding because it sets minimum
standards); 120 CONG. REc. 29,957 (1974) (statement of Sen. Ribicoff) (noting
that employers make unwise investments or manipulate pension funds); 120 CONG.
REc. 29,950 (statement of Sen. Bentsen) ("Government statistics indicate that dur-
ing 1972 alone more than 15,000 pension plan participants lost retirement bene-
fits because their pension plan terminated with insufficient assets to meet all plan
obligations.").
Congress also aimed to alleviate the "maze of different and often conflicting
state laws and regulations that resulted in administrative inefficiencies and costs
that ultimately hurt plan participants." Brauch, supra, at 1238; see also 120 CONG.
REc. 29,198 (1974) (statement of Rep. Ullman) (finding that "these new require-
ments have been carefully designed to provide adequate protection for employees
and, at the same time, provide a favorable setting for the growth and development
of private pension plans"); 120 CONG. REc. 29,210 (1974) (statement of Rep. Ros-
tenkowski) (expressing that "[t]he goal of this legislation was to strengthen the
2
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istration, ERISA preempts state regulation of employee benefit plans, and
it grants federal courts exclusive jurisdiction to enforce its provisions.5
ERISA is silent, however, as to whether prejudgment interest may be
awarded to a party prevailing in a lawsuit against the administrator of a
pension fund. 6 Although ERISA is silent with respect to the availability of
prejudgment interest, it provides courts with discretion to award plan ben-
rights of employees under existing pension systems, while at the same time encour-
aging the expansion of these plans and the creation of new ones"); 120 CONG. REC.
29,945 (1974) (statement of Sen. Long) (observing that "[wle know that new pen-
sion plans will not be adopted and that existing plans will not be expanded and
liberalized if the costs are made overly burdensome, particularly for employers
who generally foot most of the bill"); 120 CONG. REc. 29,949 (1974) (statement of
Sen. Bentsen) (noting that "it is important to recognize that if minimum standards
are set too high, we would discourage the creation of new plans"); 120 CONG. REc.
29,953 (1974) (statement of Sen. Nelson) (stating that "[iln all its deliberations
and decisions, Congress was acutely aware that under our voluntary pension system
the cost of financing pension plans is an important factor in determining whether
a pension plan will be adopted").
5. See Peter J. Wiedenbeck, Implementing ERISA: Of Policies and "Plan," 72
WASH. U. L.Q. 559, 565, 569-71 (1996) (discussing various aspects of ERISA pre-
emption). See generally 60A AM. JUR. 2D Pensions and Retirement Funds §§ 99-135
(1988) (discussing aspects and instances of ERISA preemption of state law); Cathe-
rine L. Fisk, The Last Article About the Language of ERISA Preemption? A Case Study of
the Failure of Textualism, 33 HLv. J. ON LEGIS. 35 (1996) (discussing cases address-
ing preemption under ERISA). Title I's regulatory and enforcement provisions
preempt "any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any
employee benefit plan. . . ." 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1994). "State law" includes "all
laws, decisions, rules, regulations, or other State action having the effect of law of
any State." Id. § 1144(c)(1).
In addition to exercising exclusive jurisdiction over the enforcement of ER-
ISA's requirements, federal courts also exercise concurrent jurisdiction with state
courts over suits by a participant or beneficiary to enforce the terms of an ERISA-
governed plan. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(1) (1994) (mandating concurrent
jurisdiction).
6. See Brown v. Hiatts, 82 U.S. 177, 185 (1872) (defining interest). Interest is
defined as "compensation allowed by law ... for the use or forbearance of money,
or as damages for its detention.. . ." Id. Prejudgment interest is interest accruing
on monies owed from the date of the delayed payment up to the date ofjudgment.
See JOHN Y. GOTANDA, SUPPLEMENTAL DAMAGES IN PRIvATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 1
(1998). For purposes of this Casebrief, prejudgment interest will be distinguished
from "interest on delayed payments." Interest on delayed payments is interest that
accrues absent underlying litigation under ERISA establishing entitlement to the
funds. See Fotta v. Trustees of the United Mine Workers, 165 F.3d 209, 211 (3d Cir.
1998) (discussing this variant of interest). For a further discussion of these types of
interest, see infra notes 16-29 and accompanying text.
ERISA is silent on whether interest may be awarded. See generally 29 U.S.C.
§§ 1001-1461 (failing to create general power to award prejudgement interest
under ERISA); ROBERT L. HAIG, BusiNEss AND COMMERCIAL LITIGATION IN FEDERAL
COURTS § 68.14 (1998) (noting ERISA's silence on availability of prejudgment in-
terest awards). ERISA, however, does expressly provide courts with power to award
prejudgment interest on delinquent employer contributions to a multi-employer
plan. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (g) (2) (creating power to award prejudgment interest).
For a discussion of plan administrators' attempts to use this clause in a statutory
construction argument to rebut a general power to award prejudgment interest
under ERISA, see infra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
1999]
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eficiaries "other appropriate equitable relief' to redress violations of ER-
ISA or to enforce any ERISA provision. 7 Several courts of appeals have
used this discretion to award prejudgment interest to plan beneficiaries to
fully compensate the party for delay in payments under ERISA plans.8
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, however, has
recently broken new ground by extending the rationale undergirding the
payment of prejudgment interest and holding that interest may be
awarded on delays in payment under ERISA benefits-even when no litiga-
tion under ERISA occurs to recover the payments. 9 This new cause of
7. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3)(B) (1994) (enumerating two instances courts
may award "other appropriate equitable relief"). See generally Francis M. Dough-
erty, What Constitutes "Other Appropriate Equitable Relief" Under §§ 502(a)(3)(B),
502(a)(5)(B) of Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (29 US.C.A.
§§ 1132(a)(3)(B), 1132(a)(5)(B)), Which May be Obtained to Redress Violations, or to En-
force Provisions, of Act, 98 A.L.R. FED. 705 (1990) (outlining judicial construction of
provisions awarding various types of relief). For an introduction on litigating
under ERISA, see generally DAVID M. COOK & TERESE M. CONNERTON, AMERICAN
BAR ASSOCIATION CENTER FOR CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION NATIONAL INSTITUTE,
PROCEDURAL APECTS OF LITIGATING ERISA CLAIMS, available in Westlaw, N98EBAB
ABALGLED E-1 (1998); Frank Cummings, ERISA Litigation: An Overview of Major
Claims and Defenses, SD09 ALI-ABA 97 (July 6, 1998); Michael J. Dell, ERISA Litiga-
tion Issues, 560 PLI/LIT 67 (1997).
8. See, e.g., Cottrill v. Sparrow, Johnson & Ursillo, Inc., 100 F.3d 220, 223 (1st
Cir. 1996) (upholding availability of prejudgment interest under ERISA); Mansker
v. TMG Life Ins. Co., 54 F.3d 1322, 1328 (8th Cir. 1995) (holding that prejudg-
ment interest is "other appropriate equitable relief" under ERISA); Diduck v. Kas-
zycki & Sons Contractors, Inc., 974 F.2d 270, 286 (2d Cir. 1992) ("[A] court has
wide discretion... to award prejudgment interest."); Schake v. Colt Indus. Operat-
ing Corp. Severance Plan, 960 F.2d 1187, 1192 n.4 (3d Cir. 1992) (noting that
prejudgment interest is available in actions to recover benefits under ERISA);
Anthuis v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 971 F.2d 999, 1010 (3d Cir. 1992) (noting
that prejudgment interest is available despite ERISA's silence); Stroh Container
Co. v. Delphi Indus., Inc., 783 F.2d 743, 752 (8th Cir. 1986) (recognizing availabil-
ity of prejudgment interest under ERISA); Shaw v. International Ass'n of Machin-
ists & Aerospace Workers Pension Plan, 750 F.2d 1458, 1465 (9th Cir. 1985)
(noting discretion of court in awarding prejudgment interest under ERISA). For a
summary of recent case law developments in the area of prejudgment interest
under ERISA, see generally Terese M. Connerton, Suits By Beneficiaries Against
Plans or Employers to Recover Benefits, SB68 ALI-ABA 569, 636-37 (Jan. 23, 1997)
[hereinafter Connerton, Suits By Beneficiaries]; Terese M. Connerton, Suits By Bene-
ficiaries Against Plans or Employers to Recover Benefits, CA23 ALI-ABA 207, 270-71
(Feb. 1, 1996) [hereinafter Connerton, Suits By Beneficiaries Against Plans]; Roger
C. Siske et al., What's New in Employee Benefits: A Summary of Current Case and Other
Developments, SC17 ALI-ABA 1, 138-39 (Oct. 16, 1997). For an introduction to the
definition of and issues involved in calculating prejudgment interest, see generally
John C. Keir & Robin C. Keir, Opportunity Cost: A Measure of Projudgment Interest, 39
Bus. LAW. 129 (1983); Knoll, supra note 1, at 293; R.F. Lanzillotti & A.K. Esquibel,
Measuring Damages in Commercial Litigation: Present Value of Lost Opportunities, 5 J.
AccT. AUDITING & FIN. 125 (1990);James M. Patell et al., Accumulating Damages in
Litigation: The Roles of Uncertainty and Interest Rates, I1 J. LEGAL STUD. 341 (1982).
9. See Fotta, 165 F.3d at 214 (creating presumptive right to interest for any
delayed payments under ERISA plan). Tangential litigation may, in some cases,
occur to substantively establish a right to funds under ERISA. See, e.g., id. (noting
Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision upholding right to receive worker's com-
810 [Vol. 44: p. 807
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action has the potential to enhance a client's recovery or liability, thus
practitioners should follow its development."
This Casebrief explains the Third Circuit's approach to awarding in-
terest under ERISA, focusing on the watershed development in Fotta v.
Trustees of the United Mine Workers, 1 in which the court created a cause of
action for interest on delayed payments under ERISA-governed plans.
12
Part II discusses the purpose of interest, highlights ERISA's approach to
awarding interest and chronicles the Third Circuit's and other circuits'
approaches to awarding prejudgment interest.1 3 Part III explains the
Third Circuit's creation of an entitlement to interest under ERISA for de-
lays in payment of ERISA-governed funds. 14 Part TV highlights several re-
sults and unanswered questions after Fotta.
15
pensation benefits). The litigation, however, that is lacking, is direct litigation
under ERISA to establish entitlement to funds. See id. at 212 (noting difference
between interest on delayed payments and prejudgment interest).
10. See, e.g., Anthuis, 971 F.2d at 1001 (awarding $15,245.00 severance pay and
$13,570.78 prejudgment interest). As a further illustration of large prejudgment
interest awards, see American Bell Int'l, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 12 Iran-
U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 170, 229-31 (1986) (awarding approximately $28 million in
interest in international context); Kuwait v. Aminoil (Final Award of Mar. 24,
1982), reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 976, 1042 (1982) (awarding $83 million in damages
and $96 million in interest).
Despite the practical effect of interest awards increasing claim recovery, most
courts treat the issue perfunctorily. See Keir & Keir, supra note 8, at 131-32 (stating
that most courts ignore prejudgment interest). One court poignantly summarized,
over 100 years ago, the treatment of interest by courts:
The question of interest is one much more often passed upon than care-
fully considered by the courts. It is usually presented only incidentally to
much more important issues, and often decided one way or the other at
the close of exhaustive investigation of the other questions, and with the
perhaps unconscious feeling that it is not of sufficient magnitude to jus-
tify further serious labor.
Laycock v. Parker, 79 N.W. 327, 332 (Wis. 1899). One commentator noted that
"th[e]se words could have been written today." Knoll, supra note 1, at 301 n.47
(citing to Nelson v. Travelers Ins. Co., 306 N.W.2d 71, 75 (Wis. 1981), statement,
"With some exceptions, these observations could be made with equal pertinence
today... ").
11. 165 F.3d 209 (3d. Cir. 1998).
12. See id. (creating cause of action). For a further discussion of the Third
Circuit's creation of a cause of action for interest on delayed payments under ER-
ISA, see infra notes 105-32 and accompanying text.
13. For a further discussion of interest and several circuits' approaches to the
awarding of prejudgment interest, see infra notes 16-29, 43-78 and accompanying
text.
14. For a further discussion of the Third Circuit's holding in Fotta, see infra
notes 95-132 and accompanying text.
15. For a further discussion of the result of Fotta and unanswered questions
after the Fotta decision, see infra notes 133-65 and accompanying text.
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II. OVERVIEW. OF THE AWARDING OF INTEREST UNDER ERISA
A. Interest Basics
1. Interest Generally
Interest is a sum paid to compensate for the temporary withholding
of money and the loss of its use by the party entitled to it.16 When
awarded, a claimant need not generally prove actual loss. 1 7 Damages are
16. See DAN B. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 3.6(1), at 333
(2d ed. 1993) (defining interest). The concept of interest dates to Roman Law.
See Library of Congress v. Shaw, 478 U.S. 310, 315 n.2 (1986) (citing WILLIAM J.
ASHLEY, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH ECONOMIC HISTORY AND THEORY 196
(1966); LEADAM, INTEREST AND USERY, in PALGRAVE'S DICrIONARY OF POLrICAL
ECONOMY 432 (Henry Higgins ed., 1925)).
Several common law restraints on interest have developed over the years. The
traditional rule is that prejudgment interest is not compounded annually. See
Knoll, supra note 1, at 306; see also Peter C. Canellos & Edward D. Kleinbard, The
Miracle of Compound Interest: Interest Deferral and Discount After 1982, 38 TAX. L. REV.
565, 566 (1983) ("Financial accounting generally follows the compound interest
model."); Knoll, supra, at 306-08 (explaining, with formulas, differences between
simple and compound interest); Lawrence Lokken, The Time Value of Money Rules,
42 TAX. L. REV. 1, 11-14 (1986) (discussing interest); PatrickJ. McDivitt, Comment,
PreJudgment Interest as an Element of Damages: Proposed Solutions for a Colorado Prob-
lem, 49 U. COLO. L. REV. 335, 34243 (1978) (discussing aspects of compounding
interest); Anthony E. Rothschild, Comment, Prejudgment Interest: Survey and Sugges-
tion, 77 Nw. U. L. REv. 192; 218 (1982) (same). With simple interest, the interest is
calculated each year on the original base amount. See Knoll, supra, at 306. In
contrast, with compounded interest, the interest from the previous period is added
to the base amount, and interest then accrues on this new amount. See id. Com-
pound interest, thus, produces a larger amount. See id.
Despite the common law rule, some state statutes have liberalized interest,
permitting compound interest to accrue. See id. at 306-07 (noting variations on
common law rule); see also Big Bear Properties, Inc. v. Gherman, 157 Cal. Rptr.
443, 446-47 (Ct. App. 1979) (noting general rule that interest may not be com-
pounded unless statutory provisions provide otherwise or parties agree). When
state statutes are silent, the majority rule appears to be that simple interest is
awarded. See Knoll, supra note 1, at 307 (noting majority rule and arguing that
compound interest is more appropriate). Under federal law, the decision whether
to award simple or compound interest is left to the discretion of the court. See id.;
see also Bio-Rad Labs., Inc. v. Nicolet Instrument Corp., 807 F.2d 964, 969 (Fed. Cir.
1986) (noting district court's' discretion to award simple or compound interest).
In addition to the simple/compound debate, there exist limits developed in
the common law regarding the types of claims that may recover interest. See Knoll,
supra note 1, at 351 ("As the law is currently enforced, not all awards generate
prejudgment interest."). The common law rule is that interest is not generally
recoverable on unliquidated claims such as personal injury awards, punitive dam-
ages, claims not ascertainable by a fixed dollar amount and nonpecuniary losses,
such as pain and suffering. See id.; see also 1 DAN B. DOBBS, DOBBS LAw OF REME-
DIES: DAMAGES, EQUITy, RESTITUTION § 3.6(4), at 356 (3d ed. 1993) (noting gen-
eral rule that most jurisdictions do not assess prejudgment interest on punitive
damages).
17. See GOTANDA, supra note 6, at 14 (noting lack of necessity to prove actual
damage for interest claims).
[Vol. 44: p. 807
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normally presumed because the delay in payment deprives the claimant of
the opportunity to invest the money owed to him or her.18
2. Prejudgment Interest
Prejudgment or compensatory interest is interest included as part of
an award. 19 In contrast, post-judgment interest is interest that accrues on
an award.20 The rationale for awarding prejudgment interest to a success-
18. See id. (stating rationale for lack of necessity of proof of actual damage to
receive interest). The United States Supreme Court explained this rationale:
"Every one who contracts to pay money on a certain day knows that, if he fails to
fulfil his contract, he must pay the established rate of interest as damages for his
non-performance. Hence, it may correctly be said that such is the implied contract
of the parties." Spalding v. Mason, 161 U.S. 375, 396 (1896) (quoting Curtis v.
Innerarity, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 146, 154 (1848)); see Funkhouser v.J.B. Preston Co.,
290 U.S. 163, 168 (1933) (stating that plaintiff is "not fully compensated if he is
confined to the amount found to be recoverable as of the time of the breach" with
no added compensation for delay in payment); Proctor & Gamble Distrib. Co. v.
Sherman, 2 F. Supp. 165, 166 (S.D.N.Y. 1924) ("Whatever may have been our
archaic notions about interest, in modem financial communities... [t] he present
use of my money is itself a thing of value and, if I get no compensation for its loss,
my remedy does not altogether right my wrong."); Knoll, supra note 1, at 296 ("Be-
cause excess funds can be lent at interest and funds can be borrowed only by pay-
ing interest, unless interest is assessed on the original judgment the successful
plaintiff is not fully compensated and the losing defendant is unjustly enriched.").
19. See GOTANDA, supra note 6, at 13 (defining interest). No universal rule
governs the awarding of prejudgment interest. See Knoll, supra note 1, at 297 (not-
ing that prejudgment interest awards are "far from universal"). Courts take one of
three approaches regarding prejudgment interest. See Note, Developments in the
Law: Damages-1935-47, 61 HARv. L. REv. 113, 136 (1947) (noting three historic
approaches). Some United States jurisdictions bar recovery. See Rothschild, supra
note 16, at 200 (stating that Illinois state courts award prejudgment interest only
when expressly provided by contract or in one of limited situations expressly listed
in state statute). Several courts and statutes allow courts, at their discretion, to
award prejudgment interest. See id. at 204 (noting discretion). This approach rep-
resents the practice used by the several courts of appeals. See, e.g., Fotta v. Trustees
of the United Mine Workers, 165 F.3d at 209, 212 (3d Cir. 1998) (discussing prece-
dent within Third Circuit giving courts discretion to award prejudgment interest).
Other courts expressly recognize a successful plaintiffs entitlement to prejudge-
ment interest. See Rothschild, supra note 16, at 209 (noting absolute right to re-
cover interest).
The reluctance of some legislatures and courts to award prejudgment interest
is rooted in "an ancient hostility towards interest." Knoll, supra note 1, at 298; see
Keir & Keir, supra note 8, at 131 (stating that "ancient and medieval prejudices
against the charging of interest" affect current attitudes toward awarding it). Past
attitudes toward interest were hostile because interest was viewed as a means of
punishing a defendant rather than compensating a plaintiff. See Knoll, supra note
1, at 298. This view, however, has waned, and "the trend is toward awarding pre-
judgment interest on all monetary awards." Knoll, supra, at 299; see Patrick C. Dia-
mond, Note, The Minnesota Prejudgment Interest Amendment: An Analysis of the Offer-
Counteroffer Provision, 69 MINN. L. REv. 1401, 1401 (1985) (noting trend). For an
historical overview of prejudgment interest, see Martin Oyes, Note, Prejudgment In-
terest in South Dakota, 33 S.D. L. REv. 484, 485-88 (1988).
20. See GOTANDA, supra note 6, at 56 (defining post-judgment interest). This
Casebrief does not focus on the awarding of post-judgment interest under ERISA;
it will be discussed occasionally to provide a contrast with the awarding of prejudg-
7
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ment interest. As a general rule, however, courts do award post-judgment interest
in ERISA cases. See, e.g., Smith v. American Int'l Life Assurance Co. of N.Y., 50
F.3d 956, 957 (11th Cir. 1995) (awarding post-judgment interest at federal rate).
In contrast to prejudgment interest, post-judgment interest is exclusively a
statutory creation. See Knoll, supra note 1, at 359 (noting pedigree of post-judg-
ment interest). Whether postjudgment interest is awarded "can be financially sig-
nificant because the period between the date of the award and payment can be
lengthy, especially when a suit is required to enforce the award." GOTANDA, supra
note 6, at 56. Post-judgment interest serves three purposes. See id. at 58. First,
similar to prejudgment interest, it compensates the successful party for the loss of
the use of money between the rendering of the judgment and payment. See id.
Second, it "creates an incentive for the unsuccessful party to avoid frivolous ap-
peals." Id. Third, it "encourages parties to promptly pay the damages, and thus
eliminates judicial proceedings to enforce the award." Id.
Unlike prejudgment interest, a federal statute exists governing the availability
of and rate of post-judgment interest in federal courts. See 28 U.S.C. § 1961
(1994). Section 1961 provides:
(a) Interest shall be allowed on any money judgment in a civil case recov-
ered in a district court .... Such interest shall be calculated from the
date of the entry of the judgment, at a rate equal to the coupon issue
yield equivalent (as determined by the Secretary of the Treasury) of the
average accepted auction price for the last auction of fifty-two week
United States Treasury bills settled immediately prior to the date ofjudg-
ment ....
(b) Interest shall be computed daily to the date of payment... and shall
be compounded annually.
Id.
All states also have statutes providing for the awarding of post-judgment inter-
est. See Brian P. Miller, Comment, Statutory Post-Judgment Interest: The Effect of Legis-
lative Changes AfterJudgment and Suggestions for Construction, 1994 B.Y.U. L. REv. 601,
618-31 (1994) (listing each state's statute). The method of setting the rate, how-
ever, varies from state to state. See GOTANDA, supra note 6, at 68 (noting three
methods to set rate).
Some statutes fix the rate of interest at a specified rate. See ALA. CODE § 8-8-10
(1993) (12%); Aiuz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-1201 (1994) (10%); AR& CODE ANN.§ 16-65-114 (Michie 1987) (same); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 685.010 (West 1987)
(same); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 37-39 (Supp. 1994) (same); GA. CODE ANN. § 7-4-12
(1989) (12%); HAW. REv. STAT. § 478-3 (Supp. 1992) (10%); ILL. COMp. STAT. CH.
ANN. Ch. 735, para. 5/2-1303 (West 1992) (9% or 6% "ifjudgment debtor is a unit
of local government"); IND. CODE ANN. § 24-4.6-1-101 (Michie Supp. 1994) (8%);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 535.3 (West Supp. 1994) (10%); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 360.040
(Michie 1987) (12%); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 1602-A (West Supp. 1993)
(15% if in district court; otherwise, treasury bill rate plus 7%); MD. CODE ANN.,
CTS. &JuD. PROC. § 11-107 (1989) (10%); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 235, § 8 (West
1986) (awarding interest at same rate "as provided for prejudgment interest in
such award, report, verdict, or finding"); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 408.040 (West 1990)
(9%); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 8101 (West 1996) (6%); S.C. CODE ANN. § 34-31-
20(B) (Law. Co-op. 1987) (14%); S.D. CODIFIED LAws §§ 54-3-5.1 (Michie 1990)
(stating that "[i]nterest is payable on all judgments... at the Category B rate of
interest.., in § 54-3-16"), 54-3-16(2) (Supp. 1994) (10%); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-
14-121 (1988) (same); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2903 (Supp. 1993) (awarding 12%);
VT. CODE ANN. tit. 5, § 426 (Supp. 1994) (9%); VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-330.54
(Michie 1993) (same); WASH. REv. CODE § 4.56.110 (Supp. 1994) (12% or yield of
26-week treasury bill plus 4%, whichever is greater); W. VA. CODE § 56-6-31 (Supp.
1994) (10%); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 815.05(8) (West 1994) (12%); WYO. STAT. ANN.
§ 1-16-102 (Michie Supp. 1994) (10%).
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ful plaintiff is two-fold.21 First, prejudgment interest promotes fairness by
fully compensating a party for losses incurred by the delayed payment.22
The payment of prejudgment interest ensures that the successful party re-
In other states, the rate of interest is tied to an index or market rate. See D.C.
CODE ANN. §§ 28-3302 (1981) (stating that rate "on judgments ...against the
District of Columbia, or its officers" is 4%, and in all other cases the rate is "70% of
the rate of interest set by the Secretary of the Treasury pursuant to section 6621 of
the Internal Revenue Code of 1986"), 15-109 (stating that in breach of contract
cases, judgment "shall allow interest on the amount... from the date of the judg-
ment only"); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 55.03 (West 1994) (stating that rate shall be estab-
lished by "averaging the discount rate of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York for
the preceding year, then adding 500 basis points to the averaged federal discount
rate"); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 549.09 (West Supp. 1994) (stating that rate "shall be
based on the secondary market yield of one year United States treasury bills" for
most recent calendar month); N.J. CT. R. 4:42-11 (stating that rate is based on state
fund).
Some states set interest rates by combining a fixed percentage with another
rate. See ALASKA STAT. § 09.30.070 (Michie 1983) (3% plus Twelfth Federal Re-
serve District discount rate in effect on January 2 of year in which judgment is
entered); COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-21-101 (1987) (discount rate plus 2%); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 6, § 2301 (1993) (federal reserve discount rate plus 5%); IDAHO CODE
§ 28-22-104 (1993) (5% plus weekly average yield of treasury securities as adjusted
to constant maturity of one year); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 16-204 (1988) (discount rate
plus 4%, depending on year of judgment); MICH. COMP. LAws § 600.6455 (1987)
(1% plus five-year treasury notes rate); NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. § 17.130 (Michie
1993) (2% plus prime rate at largest bank in Nevada); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 336:1 (1984) (2% plus prevailing discount rate of interest on 52-week United
States treasury bills at last auction thereof preceding last day of September in each
year); OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 727 (1988) (4% plus treasury bill rate at first of year);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 15-1-4 (Supp. 1994) (28 U.S.C. § 1961 rate plus 2%).
Still other states allow courts to exercise discretion in setting the rate of inter-
est. See Miss. CODE ANN. § 75-17-7 (1972) (providing that 'Judgments or decrees
shall bear interest at a per annum rate set by the judge hearing the complaint from
a date determined by such judge to be fair"); N.J. CT. R. 4:42-11 (providing interest
rates on judgments are established by Supreme Court of New Jersey and then set
forth in New Jersey court rules).
21. See Knoll, supra note 1, at 295 ("Prejudgment interest plays an important
role in promoting fairness and efficiency."). Several commentators have argued
against awarding prejudgment interest because, they suggest, it discourages settle-
ment. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAw 558-59 (4th
ed. 1992) (arguing that prejudgment interest discourages settlement by increasing
stakes); Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Disputing Through Agents: Coopera-
tion and Conflict Between Lawyers in Litigation, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 509, 535-36 (1994)
(arguing that parties are less likely to cooperate as difference between market in-
terest rate and prejudgment interest rate increases); George L. Priest, Private Liti-
gants and the Court Congestion Problem, 69 B.U. L. REv. 527, 539 (1989) (proposing
that prejudgment interest discourages settlement by significantly increasing settle-
ment cost); Geoffrey P. Miller, Comment, Some Thoughts on the Equilibrium Hypothe-
sis, 69 B.U. L. REv. 561, 567 (1989) (proposing that prejudgment interest both
discourages settlement by increasing stakes and encourages settlement by reducing
defendant's incentive to delay). 'But see HANS ZEISEL ET AL., DELAY IN THE COURT
133-36 (1959) (arguing that prejudgment interest does not discourage
settlement).
22. See Knoll, supra note 1, at 295 (noting that fairness requires interest to be
awarded to compensate party fully).
9
Bach: ERISA - The Awarding of Interest as Other Appropriate Equitable R
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1999
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
ceives full compensation and that the defendant pays the entire penalty. 23
Second, prejudgment interest promotes efficiency in two ways. 24 Because
prejudgment interest fully compensates, it provides future litigants with an
added incentive to take precautions when engaging in the activity that pro-
duced the judgment.25 In addition, prejudgment interest deters delays in
litigation.26 Claims for prejudgment interest generally raise three issues:
(1) whether interest may be awarded; (2) if it may be awarded, for what
period of time it accrues; and (3) at what rate the interest is to be
awarded. 2
7
3. "Interest on Delayed Payments" Under ERISA
Similar to prejudgment interest, interest on delayed payments serves
to compensate the prevailing party and to prevent unjust enrichment to
the losing party.2 8 In contrast to prejudgment interest, which results when
23. See id. at 296 (stating that interest "put[s] both parties in the same posi-
tion that they would have been in if the judgment had been paid immediately"); see
also In re Pago Pago Aircrash of Jan. 30, 1974, 525 F. Supp. 1007, 1014 (C.D. Cal.
1981) ("An individual who must litigate to recover damages should be placed in
the same position, when he recovers, as the individual who recovered the day he
suffered an injury."); H. Deane Wong, Comment, Prejudgment Interest: Too Little,
Too Much, or Both?, 10 ALASKA L. REv. 219, 221-23 (1981) (listing rationales for
awarding prejudgment interest as compensation for plaintiffs loss and prevention
of defendant's unjust enrichment).
24. See Knoll, supra note 1, at 296 (stating that second rationale for interest is
efficiency).
25. See id. (stating that, without prejudgment interest, "prospective defend-
ants will be undeterred and will take too few precautions, whereas prospective
plaintiffs will be overdeterred and will take excessive precautions"); see also POSNER,
supra note 21, at 163-65 (arguing that tort system ensures efficient levels of precau-
tionary measures); cf James A. Henderson, Jr., Product Liability and the Passage of
Time: The Imprisonment of Corporate Rationality, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 765, 775-76 (1983)
(arguing that failure to grant prejudgment interest discourages manufacturers
from modifying defective products).
26. See Knoll, supra note 1, at 297 (arguing that, without prejudgment inter-
est, defendants have incentive to "stretch out litigation"); see also POSNER, supra
note 21, at 564-66 (discussing equilibrium with respect to amounts opposing par-
ties spend on litigation); Recent Developments-Prejudgment Interest as Damages: New
Application of an Old Theory, 15 STAN. L. REv. 107, 111 (1962) (arguing to use pre-
judgment interest to "discourage defendant's use of 'the law's delay' as an instru-
ment of coercion"); Rothschild, supra note 16, at 209 (noting several jurisdictions'
use of prejudgment interest). Professor Knoll provides an economic analysis for
this conclusion. See Knoll, supra note 1, at 297. Delayingjudgment "provide [s] the
defendant with an interest free loan from the plaintiff until the judgment is ren-
dered." Id. As a result, the defendant benefits at the plaintiff's expense by pro-
longing litigation because the defendant could not otherwise borrow money
without paying interest. See id. Knoll argues that setting interest at a market rate
will negate either party being helped or hindered in this respect. See id.
27. See GOTANDA, supra note 6, at 11-12 (framing three issues). For a thor-
ough survey of national laws and international arbitral tribunal approaches to the
awarding of prejudgment interest, see generally id. at 11-55.
28. Compare Fotta v. Trustees of the United Mine Workers, 165 F.3d 209, 212
(3d Cir. 1998) (noting that making plaintiff whole and preventing unjust enrich-
816 [Vol. 44: p. 807
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a court awards interest as part of an underlying judgment, interest on
delayed payments may accrue, absent an underlying judgment on the mer-
its, in a separate cause of action seeking interest. 29
B. ERISA and the Awarding of Prejudgment Interest
1. ERISA's Silence
One of Congress' purposes for enacting ERISA was to "provid[e] for
appropriate remedies, sanctions, and ready access to the Federal courts" to
deal with breaches of ERISA or to mandate its enforcement.3 0 Courts tra-
ditionally award interest to remedy breaches of monetary obligations.
31
ERISA, however, does not grant courts a general power to award inter-
est.3 2 In contrast, ERISA does contain an express provision for prejudg-
ment interest awards in lawsuits to recover delinquent employer
contributions to a multi-employer plan. 33 Additionally, ERISA contains a
general power permitting courts to award "other appropriate equitable re-
lief' to redress violations of ERISA or to enforce any ERISA provisions. 34
The legislative history is unclear as to the remedies Congress intended
under this provision.3
5
ment are policy justifications for awarding interest on delayed payments), with
Knoll, supra note 1, at 296 (noting compensation to plaintiff and prevention of
unjust enrichment of defendant as policies undergirding award of prejudgment
interest).
29. See Fotta, 165 F.3d at 214 (establishing independent cause of action to
recover interest on delayed payments under ERISA-governed pension plans).
30. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (1994).
31. See, e.g., Knoll, supra note 1, at 299 (noting trend to award prejudgment
interest on all monetary awards).
32. See generally 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1994) (failing to create general
power to award prejudgement interest); HAiG, supra note 6, at § 68.14 (noting ER-
ISA's silence on prejudgment interest awards).
33. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1145, 1132(g)(2) (1994) (creating power to award pre-
judgment interest in defined class of lawsuits).
34. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (3) (B) (1994) (creating cause of action to obtain
"other appropriate equitable relief"). Section 1132(a) (3) provides:
(a) Persons empowered to bring a civil action
A civil action may be brought- .... .
(3) by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary (A) to enjoin any
act or practice which violates any provision of this subchapter or
the terms of the plan, or (B) to obtain other appropriate equita-
ble relief (i) to redress such violations or (ii) to enforce any pro-
visions of this subchapter or the terms of the plan ....
Id. Section 1132(a) (5) provides the Secretary of Labor with a similar cause of ac-
tion to obtain "other appropriate equitable relief." Id. § 1132 (a) (5). For the other
causes of action available under ERISA, see generally § 1132.
35. See Eduard A. Lopez, Equitable Remedies for Breach of Fiduciary Duty Under
ERISA After Varity Corp. v. Howe, 18 BERKELEYJ. EMP. & LAB. L. 323, 345 (1996)
("The legislative history does not indicate which particular remedies Congress in-
tended to provide for in section [1132(a) (3)]."); see also S.4, 93d Cong., 1st. Sess.,
§ 603 (1973), reprinted in 1 LEGIs. HIsT. 183, 579. The Senate bill provided for
"appropriate relief, legal or equitable, to redress or restrain a breach of any re-
sponsibility, obligation or duty of a fiduciary." Id: The House bill authorized the
11
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2. Supreme Court Guidance
The Supreme Court of the United States has never directly addressed
whether interest may be awarded as "other appropriate equitable relief'
under ERISA.36 The absence of express mention of interest availability in
statutes, however, has not been interpreted by the Supreme Court as mani-
festing an unequivocal congressional purpose to prohibit interest
awards.3 7 In addition, the Supreme Court has determined that Congress
intended federal courts to develop a "federal common law of rights and
obligations under ERISA-regulated plans" to be used in applying ERISA.3 8
Secretary of Labor to sue "to enjoin any act or practice which appears to him to
violate any provision of this title." H.R. 2, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., § 106 (1973), re-
printed in 1 LEGIs. HIsT. at 33.
36. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (3) (B) (creating cause of action to obtain "other
appropriate equitable relief"). For a thorough introduction to Supreme Court
cases construing and applying ERISA, see generally Andrew M. Campbell, Construc-
tion and Application of Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (29 U.S.C.A.
§§ 1001 et. seq.) by United States Supreme Court, 150 A.L.R. FED. 441 (1998).
37. See Billings v. United States, 232 U.S. 261, 284-88 (holding that statutory
silence does not bar interest recovery), affd as modified, 232 U.S. 289 (1914). A
unanimous Supreme Court recently reiterated this theme:
Although Congress has enacted a statute governing the award of
postjudgment interest in federal court litigation, see 28 U.S.C. § 1961,
there is no comparable legislation regarding prejudgment interest. Far
from indicating a legislative determination that prejudgment interest
should not be awarded, however, the absence of a statute merely indicates
that the question is governed by traditional judge-made principles.
City of Milwaukee v. Cement Div., Nat'l Gypsum Co., 515 U.S. 189, 194 (1995).
38. Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 56 (1987); see Firestone Tire &
Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 110 (1989) (noting power of courts to create
federal common law for ERISA); 120 CONG. REc. S29942 (daily ed. Aug. 22, 1974)
(statement of Sen. Javits) ("It is also intended that a body of Federal substantive
law will be developed by the courts to deal with issues involving rights and obliga-
tions under private welfare and pension plans."); William K. Carr & Robert L.
Liebross, Wrongs Without Rights: The Need for a Strong Federal Common Law of ERISA,
1993 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 221, 224-25 (arguing that Congress delegated to courts
job to create federal common law to fill gaps not addressed by ERISA); Jayne E.
Zanglein, Closing the Gap: Safeguarding Participants' Rights By Expanding the Federal
Common Law of ERISA, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 671, 678-79 (1994) (arguing that Congress
intended vast federal common law to be developed under ERISA). But see Mertens
v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 259 (1993) (cautioning that authority of courts to
develop common law under ERISA is not equivalent to authority to revise text of
statute); Martin H. Redish, Federal Common Law, Political Legitimacy, and the Interpre-
tive Process: An 'Institutionalist' Perspective, 83 Nw. U. L. REv. 761, 768-69 (1989)
(arguing that creation of federal common law represents illegitimate exercise of
policymaking powers delegated to Congress).
In the area of remedies, 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) identifies several possible civil
actions. See § 1132(a). Although detailed, the section does not exhaust every rem-
edy Congress could have created; nor does it include all the remedies that for-
merly existed under ERISA-preempted state law. SeeJeffrey A. Brauch, The Federal
Common Law of ERISA, 21 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 541, 548 (1998) (noting that
Congress could have codified more remedies). Dissatisfaction with the limited
number of remedies and preemption of state law remedies "has given impetus to
the creation of a broad federal common law under ERISA." Id. at 549.
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Although the Supreme Court has not addressed the interest issue, the
Court has addressed whether extracontractual damages, such as punitive
damages, may be awarded under ERISA.39 In Massachusetts Mutual Life
Insurance Co. v. Russel 40 the Supreme Court held that extracontractual
damages are not available under one ERISA remedy provision.4 1
Although the Court expressly reserved the question whether extracontrac-
tual damages may be available under the provision providing for "other
appropriate equitable relief," several circuits have extended the Russell de-
cision to prevent recovery under this provision.42
C. Development of Prejudgment Interest Awards in the Circuits
All circuits agree that federal district courts may award prejudgment
interest under ERISA to compensate the plaintiff for delays in benefits
owed under ERISA-governed pension plans when litigation ensues to ob-
tain benefits. 43 Within the several circuits, however, courts use various ap-
proaches for determining the accrual period.44 In addition, within the
circuits, there exists several means to determine the applicable prejudg-
ment interest rate. 45
1. Interest Award Availability
The Third Circuit's approach to the availability of prejudgment inter-
est conforms with the practice in the other circuits; all courts agree that
federal district courts may exercise discretion to award prejudgment inter-
est under ERISA.46
39. See Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 148 (1985)
(holding that extracontractual damages are not available under ERISA).
40. 473 U.S. 134 (1985).
41. See id. at 148 (holding that under § 1109(a) of ERISA, extracontractual
damages are not available).
42. See id. (reserving question of extracontractual recovery under 29 U.S.C.§ 1132 (a) (3)); International Union UAW Local 91 v. Park-Ohio Indus., Inc., 876
F.2d 894, 897 (6th Cir. 1989) (dismissing claim for extracontractual damages
under § 1132 (a) (3)); Johnson v. District 2, Marine Eng's Beneficial Assoc.-Associ-
ated Maritime Officers, Med. Plan, 857 F.2d 514, 518 (9th Cir. 1988) (same).
43. For a discussion of interest availability under ERISA, see infra notes 46-58
and accompanying text.
44. For a discussion of the three ways courts tend to set accrual dates, see infra
notes 59-65 and accompanying text.
45. For a discussion of the circuit split on accrual and interest rate, see infra
notes 66-78 and accompanying text.
46. See, e.g., Cottrill v. Sparrow,Johnson & Ursillo, Inc., 100 F.3d 220, 223 (1st
Cir. 1996) (upholding availability of prejudgment interest under ERISA); Mansker
v. TMG Life Ins. Co., 54 F.3d 1322, 1330 (8th Cir. 1995) (holding prejudgment
interest is "other appropriate equitable relief" under ERISA); Nelson v. EG & G
Energy Measurements Group, Inc., 37 F.3d 1384, 1391 (9th Cir. 1994) (same);
Lutheran Med. Ctr. v. Contractors, Laborers, Teamsters & Eng's Health & Welfare
Plan, 25 F.3d 616, 623 (8th Cir. 1994) (same); Quesinberry v. Life Ins. Co., 987
F.2d 1017, 1033 (4th Cir. 1993) (same); Diduck v. Kaszycki & Sons Contractors
Inc., 974 F.2d 270, 286 (2d Cir. 1992) ("[A] court has wide discretion ... to award
1999] CASEBRIEF 819
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In Schake v. Colt Industries Operating Corp. Severance Plan for Salaried Em-
ployees,4 7 the Third Circuit explicitly recognized the power of its courts to
award prejudgment interest under ERISA, despite the lack of an express
congressional mandate.48 The Third Circuit expanded this holding in
Anthuis v. Colt Industries Operating Corp., 49 rejecting a statutory construction
argument aimed at disavowing a court's power under ERISA to award pre-
judgment interest.50
In Anthuis, the pension fund argued that three facts counseled against
construing ERISA to contain a general power to award prejudgment inter-
est.5 1 The pension fund argued that Congress failed to specify that inter-
est may be generally awarded, that Congress expressly enumerated
instances in which interest is available under ERISA and that Congress
expressly provided that attorneys' fees and costs are available, but was si-
lent as to the availability of interest under ERISA.
52
prejudgment interest."); Drennan v. General Motors Corp., 977 F.2d 246, 253 (6th
Cir. 1992) (same); Lorenzen v. Employees Retirement Plan of the Sperry & Hutch-
inson Co., 896 F.2d 228, 236 (7th Cir. 1990) (noting that prejudgment interest is
necessary under ERISA to compensate); Ziaee v. Vest, 916 F.2d 1204, 1208 (7th
Cir. 1990) (stating that "[p]rejudgment interest compensates the prevailing party
for the loss of use of money during the time between the wrong and the conclu-
sion of the litigation"); Stroh Container Co. v. Delphi Indus., Inc., 783 F.2d 743,
751-52 (8th Cir. 1986) (recognizing availability of prejudgment interest); Shaw v.
International Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers Pension Plan, 750 F.2d
1458, 1465 (9th Cir. 1985) (noting discretion to award prejudgment interest).
47. 960 F.2d 1187 (3d Cir. 1992).
48. See id. at 1192 n.4 (noting power to award prejudgment interest); see also
Anthuis v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 971 F.2d 999, 1010 (3d Cir. 1992) (same).
In Anthuis, the court "regard [ed] Schake as providing authority for the principle
from which we may not depart that in the district court's discretion, prejudgment
interest may be awarded for a denial of pension benefits." Anthuis, 971 F.2d at
1010.
Prior to the Court of Appeals recognition, several district courts within the
Third Circuit had been awarding interest under ERISA. See, e.g., Kay v. Thrift &
Profit Sharing Plan for Employees of Boyertown Casket Co., 780 F. Supp. 1447,
1462 (E.D. Pa. 1991) (awarding interest for delayed payments under ERISA);
Pierce v. American Waterworks Co., 683 F. Supp. 996, 1001 (W.D. Pa. 1988)
(same); Kann v. Keystone Resources, Inc., 575 F. Supp. 1084, 1095-96 (W.D. Pa.
1983) (same).
49. 971 F.2d 999 (3d Cir. 1992).
50. See id. at 1008-09 (discussing whether Congress' delineation of prejudg-
ment interest availability in limited ERISA areas preempts finding general power
under ERISA to award prejudgment interest).
51. See id. at 1008-10 (noting arguments).
52. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(2)(B) (1994); see also Anthuis, 971 F.2d at 1009
(citing plan administrator's arguments). The plan administrator noted that the
structure of 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g) provides:
(1) In any action under this subchapter ... the court in its discretion may
allow a reasonable attorney's fee and costs of action to either party.
(2) In any action under this subchapter
by a fiduciary.., to enforce section 1145 [delinquent contributions] ...
the court shall award the plan...
(B) interest on the unpaid contributions
29 U.S.C. § 1132(g) (1994).
[Vol. 44: p. 807820
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To uphold the power to award prejudgment interest despite the con-
gressional silence and structure of ERISA, the Third Circuit resorted to its
general practice that "[i]n the absence of an explicit congressional direc-
tive, the awarding of prejudgment interest under federal law is committed
to the trial court's discretion." 53 In Schake and Anthuis, the Third Circuit
adopted a compensatory view of prejudgment interest-its award remedies
the loss of the use of one's money.54 This compensatory purpose aims to
Because section 1132(g) provides only that attorneys' fees and costs be
awarded, it follows, the defendant argued, that interest is available only when spec-
ified. See Anthuis, 971 F.2d at 1009. Although the court did not specifically address
this argument, it can be rebutted by labeling the types of relief sought. If interest
is deemed to be implicit in the making of a contract, there is no need to delineate
its recovery. See Spalding v. Mason, 161 U.S. 375, 396 (1896) ("Every one who
contracts to pay money on a certain day knows that, if he fails to fulfil his contract,
he must pay the established rate of interest as damages for his non-performance.
Hence, it may correctly be said that such is the implied contract of the parties.").
On the other hand, if attorneys' fees and costs are deemed to be extracontractual,
it seems reasonable that Congress would specifically define in the statute that re-
covery is possible. See GOTANDA, supra note 6, at 142-46 (stating attorneys' fees and
costs are not implied in contract).
53. Ambromovage v. United Mine Workers, 726 F.2d 972, 981-82 (3d Cir.
1984); see Board of Comm'rs of Jackson County, Kansas v. United States, 308 U.S.
343, 352 (1939) (articulating general practice in federal courts that prejudgment
interest is "given in response to considerations of fairness [and] denied when its
exaction would be inequitable"); Hardtke v. Exide Corp., 821 F. Supp. 1021, 1031
(E.D. Pa. 1993) (noting broad discretion to award prejudgment interest).
54. See Schake v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 960 F.2d 1187, 1192 n.4 (3d.
Cir. 1992) ("It is undisputed that prejudgment interest typically is granted to make
a plaintiff whole because the defendant may wrongly benefit from use of plaintiffs
money."); Anthuis, 971 F.2d at 1009 (stating "prejudgment interest is to be 'given
in response to considerations of fairness [and] denied when its exaction would be
inequitable'" (quoting Board of Comm'rs ofJackson County, Kansas, 308 U.S. at 352)).
Other circuits have also adopted this view. See, e.g., Stroh Container Co. v.
Delphi Indus., Inc., 783 F.2d 743, 752 (8th Cir. 1986) (adopting compensatory
view of prejudgment interest); Short v. Central States, Southeast & Southwest Ar-
eas Pension Fund, 729 F.2d 567, 576 (8th. Cir. 1984) (stating that prejudgment
interest is appropriate where relief granted would fall short of making party "whole
because he has been denied use of money which was his").
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit articulated, and the
Third Circuit cited with approval in Anthuis, 971 F.2d at 1010, the rationales for
awarding prejudgment interest:
[P]rejudgment interest is to be awarded when . . . the relief granted
would otherwise fall short of making the claimant whole because he or
she has been denied the use of the money which was legally due. Award-
ing prejudgment interest is intended to serve at last [sic] two purposes: to
compensate prevailing for the true costs of money damages incurred,
and, where liability and the amount of damages are fairly certain, to pro-
mote settlement and deter attempts to benefit from the inherent delays
of litigation. Thus prejudgment interest should ordinarily be granted un-
less exceptional or unusual circumstances exist making the award of in-
terest inequitable.
Stroh Container Co., 783 F.2d at 752.
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put the administering pension fund in the position it would have occupied
absent a breach. 55
A court, however, need not award interest if the equities in the case
counsel against it.5 6 Moreover, interest availability is not indefinite. 57 The
Schake court noted that post-judgment motions for discretionary awards of
prejudgment interest under ERISA must be filed within ten days of judg-
ment pursuant to jurisdictional constraints articulated by the Supreme
Court in Osterneck v. Ernst & Whinney.58
55. See Katsaros v. Cody, 744 F.2d 270, 281 (2d Cir. 1984) (discussing re-
turning pension to status quo rationale).
56. See, e.g., Landwehr v. DuPree, 72 F.3d 726, 739 (9th Cir. 1995) (affirming
district court's denial of interest); Hardtke 821 F. Supp. at 1031 (noting that pre-
judgment interest award should be granted on "'considerations of fairness [and]
denied when its exaction would be inequitable.'" (quoting Ambromovage, 726 F.2d
at 981-82); Chacosky v. Hay Group, No. CIV.A.89-8083, 1991 WL 12170, at *7 (E.D.
Pa. Feb. 1, 1991) (declining to award prejudgment interest because delay in litiga-
tion was partly attributable to plaintiff).
Courts take several factors into account in deciding whether to award prejudg-
ment interest in ERISA cases. See Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. Greene, 570 F.
Supp. 1483, 1503-04 (W.D. Pa. 1983) (adopting factors used in non-ERISA cases in
ERISA context), affd, 727 F.2d 1100 (3d Cir. 1983); see also Nedd v. United Mine
Workers, 488 F. Supp. 1208, 1219-20 (M.D. Pa. 1980) (enumerating factors for
courts to weigh in determining whether to award prejudgment interest), affd sub
nom. Ambromovage, 726 F.2d 972; Thomas v. Duralite Co., 524 F.2d 577, 589 (3d Cir.
1975) (noting considerations to be used in granting prejudgment interest); Eazor
Express, Inc. v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 520 F.2d 951, 973 (3d Cir. 1975)
(same).
The four factors used in the Third Circuit include: (1) whether the claimant
was not diligent in prosecuting the action; (2) whether the defendant was unjustly
enriched; (3) whether the award would be compensatory in nature; and (4)
whether countervailing equitable considerations mitigate against awarding pre-
judgment interest. See Pension Benefit, 570 F. Supp. at 1503. One commentator has
summed up several courts' approaches by looking to the doctrine of laches: courts
will deny interest to a plaintiff who unduly delayed in taking legal action. See
Knoll, supra note 1, at 355 (noting courts' reliance on equitable doctrine of laches
and criticizing its application because penalty varies directly with applicable rate of
interest); see also West Virginia v. United States, 479 U.S. 305, 311 n.3 (1987) (stat-
ing that "an equitable consideration such as laches" could justify denial).
57. See Schake, 960 F.2d at 1192-93 (noting ten-day limit to request prejudg-
ment interest after judgment).
58. 489 U.S. 169, 176 (1989). In Schake, the plan administrator appealed an
adverse ruling by the Western District of Pennsylvania awarding the plaintiffs pre-judgment interest, costs and attorney fees. See id. at 1189. One issue in the appeal
involved whether the district court had jurisdiction to award prejudgment interest.
See id. The court held that the district court did not have jurisdiction because an
untimely motion was filed in the case. See id. Instead of filing within 10 days after
the entry of the final judgment, counsel for plaintiffs filed a motion 97 days after
the judgment requesting prejudgment interest. See id.
The Supreme Court articulated this jurisdictional constraint in Osterneck. See
Osterneck, 489 U.S. at 175. The Court reasoned that because prejudgment interest
is an element of complete compensation, it is integral to the merits of the judg-
ment. See id. ("Thus, unlike attorney's fees ... prejudgment interest traditionally
has been considered part of the compensation due plaintiff."). As a result, any
postjudgment motion for prejudgment interest must be filed within 10 days of the
822 [Vol. 44: p. 807
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2. Period of Accrual
Prejudgment interest generally accrues from a specified date until a
judgment is rendered.5 9 The Third Circuit has not adopted a starting
date to be used in every prejudgment interest award under ERISA; instead,
district courts exercise discretion when choosing an accrual date.60 As a
result, the district courts within the Third Circuit use various starting dates
for accrual. 61
Some district courts award interest from the date of breach, i.e., the
wrongful denial of benefits. 6 2 Other district courts award interest from
the time the pension fund receives notice of default. 63 Finally, some dis-
entry of the final judgment or the court will lose jurisdiction to award it. See id. at
173; see also FED. R. Civ. P. 59(e) (1998) ("Any motion to alter or amend a judg-
ment shall be filed no later than 10 days after the entry of the judgment.").
59. See GOTANDA, supra note 6, at 22-23 (defining time of accrual).
60. For a discussion of the various methods employed by the district courts,
see infra notes 62-65 and accompanying text.
61. Several commentators advocate different starting dates for accrual. See,
e.g., Michael K Brown, The Availability of Prejudgment Interest in Personal Injury and
Wrongful Death Cases, 16 U.S.F. L. REv. 325, 349-50 (1982) (arguing it is unfair to
penalize defendant by accruing interest before claim is filed); Keir & Keir, supra
note 8, at 137 ("A rule that would be more consistent with the law of damages
would allow interest, as in the case of any other compensation, on the basis of the
wrong done, not the course of litigation."); Don W. Cloud, Jr., Note, Cavnar v.
Quality Control Parking, Inc.: Prejudgment Interest is Now Recoverable in Personal In-
jury, Wrongful Death and Survival Action Cases, 38 BAYLOR L. Rv. 385, 409 (1986)
(opining that assessing prejudgment interest from filing date is necessary to dis-
courage plaintiffs from delaying filing); Oyes, supra note 19, at 507-08 (contending
that accruing prejudgment interest from filing date will encourage hastily filed and
poorly crafted pleadings); Thomas F. Londrigan & Lawrence R. Smith, Prejudgment
Interest: Is There Profit in Court Delay?, JUDGES'J., Fall 1984, at 12, 44 (arguing that
accruing prejudgment interest from filing date will result in unnecessary filings by
those who have not yet assessed merits of their case but who do not want to delay
accrual of interest); James D. Wilson, et. al., Prejudgment Interest in Personal Injuy,
Wrongful Death, and Other Actions, 30 TRIuL LAw. GUIDE, 105, 116 (1986) (arguing
that assessing interest from injury date denies defendant opportunity to set aside
sufficient reserves).
62. See, e.g., Thomas v. Board of Trustees of Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs,
Local 542, No. CIV.A.97-CV-2423, 1998 WL 334627, at *1 (E.D. Pa. June 24, 1998)
(awarding interest from date contributions were refunded but not paid); Team-
sters Pension Trust Fund of Philadelphia & Vicinity, No. CIV.A.95-7556, 1997 WL
11292, at *34 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 10, 1997) (awarding interest from day of entitlement
to when pension vested), affd, 143 F.3d 139 (3d Cir. 1998); Haberern v. Kaupp
Vascular Surgeons Ltd. Defined Benefit Plan & Trust Agreement, 822 F. Supp.
247, 264-65 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (awarding interest from date defendants wrongfully
withheld benefits); Monfiletto v. John Hancock Healthplans, Inc., No. CIV.A.90-
5137, 1992 WL 67891, at *7 n.1 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 24, 1992) (awarding interest from
date of breach); Pierce v. American Waterworks Co., 683 F. Supp. 996, 1000-02
(W.D. Pa. 1988) (awarding interest retroactively to date disability benefits were
wrongfully withheld).
63. See Ciarlante v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., No. CIV.A.95-4646,
1996 WL 741973, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 18, 1996) (awarding prejudgment interest
from "date the complaint was served"), rev'd on other grounds, 143 F.3d 139 (3d Cir.
1998); Kay v. Thrift & Profit Sharing Plan for Employees of Boyertown Casket Co.,
1999]
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trict courts exercise discretion and choose another appropriate period
from which or during which interest will accrue. 64 Other district courts
also exercise discretion when defining the starting date of accrual for pre-
judgment interest awards under ERISA; as a result, variations similar to the
practice in the Third Circuit also exist in other jurisdictions. 65
3. Rate of Interest
No federal statute exists to govern the availability and rate of prejudg-
ment interest.66 As a result of this void and ERISA's silence on the availa-
bility of prejudgment interest, federal courts exercise discretion in fixing
the rate at which interest accrues.
67
The Third Circuit has never adopted a rate to be used in the Circuit;
instead, district courts exercise discretion.6 8 Several district courts within
the Third Circuit have reasoned that prejudgment interest arising under a
780 F. Supp. 1447, 1462 (E.D. Pa. 1991) (awarding interest based on rate obtained
immediately prior to date plaintiff first demanded benefits).
64. See Hardtke v. Exide Corp., 821 F. Supp. 1021, 1031 (E.D. Pa. 1993)
(awarding prejudgment interest only during periods when plaintiff did not delay
bringing suit); Chacosky v. The Hay Group, No. CIV.A-89-8083, 1191 WL 12170, at
*7 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 1, 1991) (noting that fixing date at which prejudgment interest is
to commence is discretionary and citing with approval Valle v. Joint Plumbing Indus.
Bd., 623 F.2d 196, 206-07 (2d Cir. 1980) (noting discretion to fix accrual date)).
For example, in Hardtke, the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania,
awarded prejudgment interest at interrupted intervals. See Hardtke, 821 F. Supp. at
1031. In the case, Hardkte was denied benefits on December 14, 1984. See id. He
waited four years before filing a Writ of Summons in December of 1988. See id.
Hardkte did not file a complaint until June 7, 1991. See id. Given these circum-
stances, the court opted not to award prejudgment interest during the period of
delay between the filing of the Writ of Summons and the filing of the complaint.
See id. The court, however, did award prejudgment interest from December 1984
to December 1988 and then from June 1991 until judgment. See id. at 1031-32
(awarding $6,799.32). Interestingly, the court still awarded interest during the
four year delay initially caused by the plaintiffs failure to file more expeditiously.
See id.
65. See, e.g., Cottrill v. Sparrow,Johnson & Ursillo, Inc., 100 F.3d 220, 223 (1st
Cir. 1996) ("Ordinarily, a cause of action under ERISA and prejudgment interest
on a plan participant's claim both accrue when a fiduciary denies a participant
benefits."); Yarde v. Pan Am. Life Ins. Co., 67 F.3d 298, 301 (4th Cir. 1995) (exer-
cising discretion to interpret when benefits were denied); see also GOTANDA, supra
note 6, at 22-23 (describing same split in approach among state courts).
66. But see 28 U.S.C. § 1961 (1994) (establishing federal postjudgment inter-
est availability and rate). For the text of § 1961, see supra note,.20.
67. See Stephen A. Weiner & Frederick A. Brodie, § 68.14 ERISA, in BUSINESS
AND COMMERCIAL LITIGATION IN FEDERAL COURTS (Robert L. Haig ed., 1998) ("Fed-
eral courts have permitted the award of [prejudgment] interest to prevailing ER-
ISA plaintiffs as a discretionary matter."); see also Rivera v. Benefit Trust Life Ins.
Co., 921 F.2d 692, 696-97 (7th Cir. 1991) (stating that prejudgment interest is pre-
sumptively awardable to prevailing ERISA plaintiff).
68. For a discussion of courts of appeals that have addressed this issue, see
infra notes 74-78 and accompanying text.
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federal statute is a federal question that must be governed by federal law. 69
For example, in Kann v. Keystone Resources, Inc.,70 the United States District
Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania looked to the most analo-
gous federal statute, the federal statutory postjudgment statute, and
adopted its rate for use as the prejudgment interest as well. 71 This rate
69. See Kay v. Thrift & Profit Sharing Plan for Employees of Boyertown Casket
Co., 780 F. Supp. 1447, 1462 (E.D. Pa. 1991) (awarding interest at § 1961 rate);
Pierce v. American Waterworks Co., 683 F. Supp. 996, 1001 (W.D. Pa. 1988)
(same); Kann v. Keystone Resources, Inc., 575 F. Supp. 1084, 1096 (W.D. Pa. 1983)
(same).
Section 1961 provides district courts with the power to award postjudgment
interest and sets its rate. See 28 U.S.C. § 1961 (1994). Some differences between
the treatment of prejudgment and postjudgment interest arise in federal court
actions depending on the source of the jurisdiction of the court. See GOTANDA,
supra note 6, at 64-65. District courts are given original jurisdiction in two in-
stances. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1994) (defining federal question jurisdiction); 28
U.S.C. § 1332 (1994) (defining diversity jurisdiction). In actions arising under di-
versity jurisdiction, federal courts must apply state substantive law and federal pro-
cedural law. See, e.g., Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 465-74 (1965) (explaining
doctrine of Erie v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)).
In actions arising under diversity jurisdiction, post-judgment interest is gener-
ally considered a procedural matter; thus, the federal rate controls. See, e.g., World
Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Jakubiec, 793 F. Supp. 825, 826-27 (N.D. Ill. 1992) (noting
that all but one Court of Appeals have ruled that federal postijudgment interest
rate controls in diversity actions); Nissho-Iwai Co. v. Occidental Crude Sales, Inc.,
848 F.2d 613, 623 (5th Cir. 1988) (stating that "postjudgment interest is better
characterized as procedural because it confers no right in and of itself"). Courts
generally consider prejudgment interest, in contrast, as a substantive issue in mat-
ters arising under diversityjurisdiction. See, e.g., In re Oil Spill by the Amoco Cadiz
Off the Coast of France On Mar. 16, 1978, 954 F.2d 1279, 1333 (7th Cir. 1992) ("In
diversity cases ... federal courts look to state law to determine the availability of
(and rules for computing) prejudgment interest"); Residential Mktg. Group, Inc.
v. Granite Inv. Group, 933 F.2d 546, 549-50 (7th Cir. 1991) (applying state prejudg-
ment interest law in diversity).
The decision whether to apply a federal or state rate may have significant
monetary impact. See GOTANDA, supra note 6, at 65 n.36. For example, in Jakubiec,
the court applied the federal rate which was below 5%, instead of the 9% pre-
scribed under Illinois law. SeeJakubiec, 793 F. Supp. at 827.
70. 575 F. Supp. 1084 (W.D. Pa. 1983).
71. See id. at 1095 (noting that 28 U.S.C. § 1961 is m ost analogous statute); see
also, e.g., Thomas v. Board of Trustees of Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, Local
542, No. CIV.A.97-CV-2423, 1998 WL 334627, at *13 (E.D. Pa. June 24, 1998)
(awarding interest at § 1961 rate); Teamsters Pension Trust Fund of Philadelphia
& Vicinity v. Littlejohn, No. CIV.A.95-7556, 1997 WL 11292, at *4 (E.D. Pa.Jan. 10,
1997) (same), affd, 155 F.3d 206 (3d Cir. 1998); Haberern v. Kaupp Vascular Sur-
geons Ltd. Defined Benefit Plan & Trust Agreement, 822 F. Supp. 247, 265 (E.D.
Pa. 1993) (same); Monfiletto v. John Hancock Healthplans, Inc., No. CIV.A.90-
5137, 1992 WL 67891, at *1 n.1 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 24, 1992) (same); Kay, 780 F. Supp.
at 1462 (same); Pierce 683 F. Supp. at 1001 (same); Kann, 575 F. Supp. at 1095
(noting § 1961 is most analogous statute).
The Kann court dealt with an issue of first impression in the district courts of
the Third Circuit. See Kann, 575 F. Supp. at 1096 ("We ... believe this to be a case
of first impression for the courts in the Third Circuit."). The court adopted the
reasoning of the Eighth Circuit in the leading case holding prejudgment interest is
available under ERISA, Dependahl v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 653 F.2d 1208 (8th Cir.
1999]
19
Bach: ERISA - The Awarding of Interest as Other Appropriate Equitable R
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1999
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
fluctuates and is "equal to the coupon issue yield equivalent ... of the
average accepted auction price for the last auction of fifty-two week United
States Treasury bills settled."7 2 District courts have taken different ap-
proaches in selecting the applicable post-judgment rate, including using
the rate existing at the time of demand for payment and averaging the
rates from the applicable period.
73
Several circuits, including the United States Courts of Appeals for the
Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Ninth Circuits, have upheld the use of the federal
post-judgment interest rate for prejudgment interest awards.7 4 In con-
trast, the United States Courts of Appeals for the Fourth and Eleventh
1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 968 (1981). See id. at 1096 ("[W]e adopt the Eighth
Circuit's holding that 28 U.S.C. § 1961, the most analogous section for post-judg-
ment interest, is to be applied.").
One commentator criticized the rate of interest established in 28 U.S.C.
§ 1961. See Knoll, supra note 1, at 359. Professor Knoll argued that the federal rate
is only appropriate when the federal government is the defendant because non-
federal government defendants cannot borrow unsecured at the § 1961 rate. See
id. As a result, the rate is generally too low and it will "encourage defendants to
file excessive appeals," thus weakening the deterrent effects of awards. Id. This
commentator suggested that a better approach would be also to use the prejudg-
ment interest rate for calculating post-judgment interest. See id. at 293, 297, 308-
11, 359 (advocating application of rate for prejudgment interest that reflects what
defendant should pay for unsecured debt).
In addition, one district court awarded the rate requested by the plaintiff-
even when the federal postjudgment rate would have been higher. See Hardtke v.
Exide Corp., 821 F. Supp. 1021, 1031 n.17 (E.D. Pa. 1993) ("Although [the § 1961]
rate may well be greater than 6%, exercising our discretion, we limit our award to
the relief requested.").
72. 28 U.S.C. § 1961 (1994).
73. Compare Kay, 780 F. Supp. at 1462 (awarding § 1961 rate "based upon the
rate obtained immediately prior to the date that plaintiff first demanded his bene-
fits"), and Kann, 575 F. Supp. at 1096 (awarding interest at rate existing when
plaintiff first demanded payment), with Pierce, 683 F. Supp. at 1002 ("Due to the
fluctuation of the postjudgment rate between... the date on which plaintiff would
have started receiving pension benefits ... and the date of this decision, we find
that the prudent and fair course is to apply the average postjudgment rate for that
period."). The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the
applicable rate is the rate during the pendency of the injury, not the rate at the
time of the judgment. See Nelson v. EG & E Energy Measurements Group, Inc., 37
F.3d 1384, 1391 (9th Cir. 1994) (noting that § 1961 rate should be based on rate
during injury).
74. See, e.g., Ford v. Uniroyal Pension Plan, 154 F.3d 613, 619 (6th Cir. 1998)
(affirming award at § 1961 rate); Mansker v. TMG Life Ins. Co., 54 F.3d 1322, 1331
(8th Cir. 1995) (reversing prejudgment interest award at state rate and applying
federal post-judgment interest rate); Nelson, 37 F.3d at 1391 ("We have held that
the interest rate ... under 28 U.S.C. § 1961 is appropriate for fixing the rate of
pre-judgment interest 'unless the trial judge finds, on substantial evidence, that the
equities of that particular case require a different rate."' (quoting Western Pac. Fish-
eries, Inc. v. S.S. President Grant, 730 F.2d 1280, 1289 (9th Cir. 1984))); Sweet v.
Consolidated Aluminum Corp., 913 F.2d 268, 270 (6th Cir. 1990) (approving use
of federal post-judgment interest rate); Blanton v. Anzalone, 760 F.2d 989, 992-93
(9th Cir. 1985) (applying federal post-judgment interest rate); Dependahl, 653 F.2d
at 1218 (applying federal post-judgment rate); see also 60A AM. JUR. 2D Remedies and
Relief §§ 1239-1240 (1988) (discussing prejudgment interest under ERISA).
[Vol. 44: p. 807
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Circuits have opted not to mandate the use of the federal post-judgment
interest rate. 75 These courts upheld their district courts' incorporation of
the prejudgment interest rate established by state law.76 Moreover, the
United State Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit upheld the use of
the market rate.7 7 This rate choice may have monetary significance be-
cause differences between the federal, state and market rates can decrease
or increase a client's recovery or liability. 78
75. See, e.g., Harrison v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 50 F. Supp. 744, 749 (M.D. Fl.
1996) (using state statutory rates as analogy to fill gap in ERISA regarding prejudg-
ment interest); see also Smith v. American Int'l Life Assurance Co. of New York, 50
F.3d 956, 958 (lth Cir. 1995) ("Because district courts have discretion in deter-
mining pre-judgment interest rates, we hold that district courts are not required to
use section 1961 (a) in computing such interest."); Quesinberry v. Life Ins. Co. of
N. Am., 987 F.2d 1017, 1030-31 (4th Cir. 1993) (upholding district court's use of
state prejudgment interest rate); Hansen v. Continental Ins. Co., 940 F.2d 971,
983-84 (5th Cir. 1991) (affirming award of prejudgment interest at state rate);
Fuchs v. Lifetime Doors, Inc., 939 F.2d 1275, 1280 (5th Cir. 1991) (upholding
district court award of prejudgment interest at state rate); see also Stephen W.
Mooney & Leigh Lawson Reeves, Labor Law, 47 MERCER L. REv. 891, 904-05 (1996)
(discussing Eleventh Circuit's approach to awarding prejudgment interest under
ERISA).
The courts that have opted not to use state rates cite uniformity in ERISA
litigation as the reason; the federal rate provides predictability. See, e.g., Cottrill v.
Sparrow, Johnson & Ursillo, Inc., 100 F.3d 220, 225 (1st Cir. 1996) ("Utilizing this
rate promotes uniformity in ERISA cases."). For a list of cases, see supra note 75.
76. See Hansen, 940 F.2d at 984 (using Texas rate). The Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit held that state law may provide guidance when no federal statute
is on point. See United States ex rel.J.R. Canion v. Randall & Blake, 817 F.2d 1188,
1193 (5th Cir. 1987) (stating that "[b]ecause the [federal act] is silent on the issue
... state law is an appropriate source of guidance").
77. See In re Oil Spill by the Amoco Cadiz Off the Coast of France on Mar. 16,
1978, 954 F.2d 1279, 1332 (7th Cir. 1992) (stating that approximation of market
rate is prime rate at various relevant periods during litigation); see also Hizer v.
General Motors Corp., 888 F. Supp. 1453, 1464 (S.D. Ind. 1995) (noting practice
of Seventh Circuit to award prejudgment interest at market rates). The rationale
for a floating rate as opposed to a fixed rate is that a fixed rate does not accurately
compensate a prevailing party for the loss of the use of money for investments. See
Hizer, 888 F. Supp. at 1463 (noting market rate is more accurate at compensating
parties). For example, where a statutory rate results in overpayments, interest be-
comes punitive; where the rate underpays, the claimant is not adequately compen-
sated. See id.
78. Compare Administrator of United States Court Statistics (chronicling pe-
riod between October of 1982 and July of 1998, where § 1961 rate fluctuated, rang-
ing anywhere from 3.13% to 12.17%), with ALAsKA STAT. § 45.45.010 (1994)
(awarding 10.5% fixed prejudgment interest), and D.C. CODE ANN. § 28.3302
(1991) (awarding 6% fixed prejudgment interest), and IND. CODE ANN. § 24-4.6-1-
101 (West 1995) (awarding 8% fixed prejudgment interest), and MAss. GEN. LAwS
ANN. ch. 231, § 6B (West 1995) (awarding 12% fixed prejudgment interest), and
N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 5004 (awarding 9% fixed prejudgment interest) (McKinney 1992 &
Supp. 1999). For a thorough discussion of the relative merits of each method of
setting the rate, see generally Knoll, supra note 1.
1999]
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D. Interest on Delayed Payments
Although the availability of prejudgment interest is settled when liti-
gation establishes entitlement to the ERISA-governed funds, a conflict in
authority exists in the district courts of the several circuits regarding
whether interest is available on delayed payments under ERISA-governed
plans.79 In Fotta, the Third Circuit dealt with this issue of first impression
and created an entitlement to interest on delayed payments under
ERISA.80
1. Interest Available
Prior to the Fotta decision, only one district court had upheld the
availability of an independent cause of action for interest under ERISA
absent an underlying judgment.8 1 The United States District Court for
the Southern District of Indiana in Hizer v. General Motors Corp. Allison Gas
Turbine Division82 likened an interest award for delayed payment to an
award of prejudgment interest.83 It held that in both instances, "interest is
an essential element of complete relief for breach of an obligation to pay
79. Compare Hizer, 888 F. Supp. at 1456 (permitting cause of action to recover
interest on delayed payments under ERISA), with Holmes v. Pension Plan of Beth-
lehem Steel Corp., 98-CV-1241, 1998 WL 901545, at *5-6 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 4, 1998)
(denying cause of action for interest on delayed payments), vacated in part on recon-
sideration, No. CIV.A.98-CV-1241, 1999 WL 124392 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 5, 1999), and
DeVito v. Pension Plan of Local 819 I.B.T. Pension Fund, 975 F. Supp. 258
(S.D.N.Y. 1997) (same), and Scott v. Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas
Pension Plan, 727 F. Supp. 1095 (E.D. Mich. 1989) (same). For a further discus-
sion of this split, see infra notes 81-94 and accompanying text.
80. See Fotta v. Trustees of the United Mine Workers, 165 F.3d 209, 214 (3d
Cir. 1998) ("We now make explicit that interest is presumptively appropriate when
ERISA benefits have been delayed."). For a discussion of this decision, see infra
notes 95-132 and accompanying text.
81. See Hizer, 888 F. Supp. at 1461 (holding that interest is "essential element"
of relief). In this case, Debra L. Hizer sought interest under an Indiana statute on
the proceeds of a life insurance policy that her deceased husband purchased. See
id. at 1456. A dispute arose over whether the policy took affect before Mr. Hizer's
death. See id. As a result, the $100,000 benefit was not paid until nearly five years
after the death. See id. Because Mr. Hizer bought the policy pursuant to an em-
ployee benefit plan sponsored by General Motors, defendants argued that Hizer
was not entitled to interest because ERISA preempts the Indiana statute providing
for interest on delayed payments. See id. The court found that ERISA did preempt
the Indiana statute. See id.; see also 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1994) (preempting any
state law that "relates to" an employee benefit plan). The court, however, went on
to analogize interest on delayed payments to prejudgment interest, and the court
awarded interest at the market rate for the period during which payment was
delayed. See id.
82. 888 F. Supp. 1453 (S.D. Ind. 1995).
83. See id. at 1461 ("Defendants offer no rationale for drawing a distinction
between prejudgment interest and interest on delayed payments, and none is
apparent.").
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benefits."8 4 Without an entitlement to interest, beneficiaries will not en-
joy "the full benefits they are entitled to receive."85
Additionally, the Hizer court cited a deterrent policy rationale.8 6 The
court reasoned that not recognizing a right to interest "would create an
incentive for benefit plans to delay payments and to retain for the plan the
interest earned."8 7 Finally, the court held that legal entitlement to inter-
est should not depend on whether a claimant has filed suit.8 8 Because a
plan administrator could be unjustly enriched whether or not there is a
judgment on entitlement to benefits under ERISA-governed plans, the
court saw no logical reason to distinguish between the two situations.8 9
2. Interest Not Available
Two district courts within the Third Circuit had dealt with this issue
prior to Fotta, both ruling that a cause of action for interest on delayed
payments under ERISA is not available.9 0 These courts, and other courts
that have reached the same conclusion, characterized the nature of the
remedy differently than the Hizer court.9'
84. Id.; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 354, cmt. c (1979) (stating
that interest is presumed recoverable for nonpayment once payment is overdue).
85. Hizer, 888 F. Supp. at 1461.
86. See id. (reasoning that if no interest is awarded, plans may delay to retain
interest earned).
87. Id.
88. See id. at 1462 ("When a benefit has been erroneously denied or delayed,
there is no reason why the legal entitlement to interest should depend on whether
the claimant has actually won a judgment or even filed suit."). The court likened
this situation to common law contract principles. See id. (drawing analogy). It
reasoned that when a party breaches a contractual obligation, interest is required
from the due date of payment. See id. (discussing common law contract princi-
ples); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 354 and cmt. c. This inter-
est is an "essential part of a complete contractual remedy." Hizer, 888 F. Supp. at
1462. Additionally, the court noted that, under the common law, the breaching
party cannot negate interest entitlement by merely paying the sum later--even if
the late payment is made before judgment is entered. See id.
89. See id. (noting that compensatory policy of interest counsels finding enti-
tlement to interest in this situation).
90. See Holmes v. Pension Plan of Bethlehem Steel Corp., No. CIV.A.98-CV-
1241, 1998 WL 901545, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 24, 1999) (holding that interest is not
available), vacated in part on reconsideration, No. CIV.A.98-CV-1 241, 1999 WL 124392
(E.D. Pa. Feb. 5, 1999); Fotta v. Trustees of the United Mine Workers, No.
CIV.A.97-CV-00566 (W.D. Pa. 1998) (unpublished opinion) (same).
91. See Holmes, 1998 WL 901545, at *1 (holding that no cause of action exists
for interest); Fotta, No. CIV.A.97-CV-00566 (same); DeVito v. Pension Plan of Local
819 I.B.T. Pension Fund, 975 F. Supp. 258, 270-72 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (same); Scott v.
Central States, Southeast & Southwest Areas Pension Plan, 727 F. Supp. 1095, 1098
(E.D. Mich. 1989) (same).
In Scott, the defendant administratively approved plaintiffs claim for pension
benefits 12 years after plaintiffs claim. See 727 F. Supp. at 1096 (noting delay).
The court denied interest because the pension plan did not prescribe interest for
delays in payments, thus, the court reasoned, the claim was extracontractual as
barred in Russell See id. at 1098. The DeVito court adopted the Scott court's reason-
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For example, in Holmes v. Pension Plan of Bethlehem Steel Corp.,92 the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania held
that the awarding of interest is an "extracontractual remedy" because the
terms of the plan do not provide for its award.93 Because the Supreme
Court in Russell held that extracontractual damages under ERISA are not
available, an independent cause of action for interest would subvert this
decision. 9
4
III. FOTA V. TRUSTEES OF TME UNITED MINE WoiKERs. THE THIRD
CIRCUIT CREATES A NEW CAUSE OF ACTION FOR INTEREST AS 'OTHER
APPROPRIATE EQUITABLE RELIEF" UNDER ERISA
A. Facts and Procedural Background of Fotta
The United Mine Workers administered a pension plan under ERISA
that provided disability insurance. 9 5 Abraham Fotta suffered a work-re-
lated injury on July 24, 1984, rendering him permanently disabled. 96 On
ing, holding that the lack of contractual provision regarding interest results in
Russell barring the claim. See DeVito, 975 F. Supp. at 272.
92. No. CIV.A.98-CV-1241, 1998 WL 901545, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 4, 1998),
vacated in part on reconsideration, No. CIV.A.98-CV-1241, 1999 WL 124392 (E.D. Pa.
Feb. 5, 1999).
93. See Holmes, 1998 WL 901545, at *6 ("We will follow the overwhelming ma-
jority position in considering interest claims as extracontractual under ERISA.").
This court subsequently reconsidered its decision in light of the Fotta decision. See
Holmes v. Pension Plan of Bethlehem Steel Corp., No. CIV.A.98-CV-1241, 1999 WL
124392, at * 1 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 5, 1999). The Eastern District decided its case 11 days
prior to the Fotta decision. See id. at *2. Following the Fotta decision, plaintiffs
swiftly moved for reconsideration in light of the intervening change in controlling
law. See id. at *1.
94. See Scott, 727 F. Supp. at 1096-97 (laying out argument that interest is ex-
tracontractual); see also Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134,
148 (1985) (holding that extracontractual damages are not available under ER-
ISA). For a further discussion of the Russell decision, see supra notes 39-42 and
accompanying text.
95. See Fotta v. Trustees of the United Mine Workers, 165 F.3d 209, 210 (3d
Cir. 1998) (noting disability aspect of pension plan). For a summation of the rele-
vant facts in Fotta, see generally MollyJ. Liskow, Even Though No Lawsuit Was Needed,
Late Payment of Benefits Does Permit Suit to Recover Interest Under ERISA, NEW JERSEY
LAWYER: THE WEEKLY NEWSPAPER, Jan. 11, 1999, at 74.
96. See Fotta, 165 F.3d at 210-11. U.S. Steel/USX Corporation employed Fotta
at the Maple Creek Mine for eight years. See Fotta v. Workmen's Compensation
Appeal Board (U.S. Steel/USX Corp. Maple Creek Mine), 626 A.2d 1144, 1145
(Pa. 1993). On July 23, 1984, while working in the mine, Fotta slipped from the
machine he was riding, falling approximately two feet to the ground. See id. He
then filed a claim for benefits under the Pennsylvania Worker's Compensation
Act. See id.; see also 77 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 1-1031 (West 1992). In the claim,
Fotta alleged that he injured his right ankle and foot during the fall. See Fotta, 626
A.2d. at 1145. Fotta's claim was reviewed twice and denied twice. See id. The refe-
ree of the first review dismissed the claim after finding that Fotta's disability was
not due to a work-related injury. See id. The referee found that the injury was
caused by a pre-existing tumor known as a pigmented villonodular synovitis. See id.
The Worker's Compensation Appeal Board affirmed the decision. See id. The Ap-
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September 1, 1993, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania upheld the causal
relationship between Fotta's work and his disability under the Penn-
sylvania Worker's Compensation Act.
9 7
As a result of this ruling, the Trustees granted Fotta disability benefits
under ERISA with an effective date of September 1, 1993.98 The Trustees,
however, subsequently revised this effective date and granted Fotta disabil-
ity benefits effective August 1, 1984.9 9 Fotta received back payment in the
amount of $21,600 reflecting disability benefits from August 1, 1984 to
September 1, 1993.100 Fotta then demanded interest on this back pay-
ment, and the Trustees refused. 10 1
Fotta sued the Trustees in the United States District Court for the
Western District of Pennsylvania. 10 2 The Western District dismissed the
complaint for failure to state a claim.1 03 Fotta then appealed this ruling to
the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.
10 4
B. The Third Circuit's Decision
In Fotta, the Third Circuit recognized a cause of action for delays in
payment of ERISA-governed benefits even when the claimant does not re-
sort to litigation under ERISA to recover the payment.10 5 The Third Cir-
peal Board, however, allowed Fotta to resubmit his claim in light of new medical
reports. See id. At the second hearing, Fotta offered two medical reports, which
were rebutted by the employer's expert. See id. The referee cited the employer's
expert testimony as the basis for the decision to deny benefits. See id. at 1146.
After this second dismissal, Fotta appealed to the Board which affirmed the deci-
sion. See id. Fotta then appealed to the Commonwealth Court. See id. A divided
panel affirmed the decision. See id. The majority reasoned that the Board commit-
ted no error by relying on one expert over the other when faced with conflicting
reports. See id. The dissent concluded that the Board misconstrued the evidence
that Fotta's accident at work contributed to the disability. See id. Fotta then ap-
pealed to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania which granted allocatur. See id. The
Supreme Court held that a causal relationship did exist between the injury at work
and the disability and upheld Fotta's entitlement to disability benefits under Penn-
sylvania law. See id. at 1147. For a discussion of the significance of this case for
proving sufficiency of medical evidence, see Peter J. Weber, Survey of Significant
Developments in the Law, 66 PA. B. Ass'N. Q. 16, 20-21 (Jan. 1995).
97. See Fotta, 626 A.2d at 1147 (upholding Fotta's claim). For a summary of
the facts of the case, see supra note 96.
98. See Fotta, 165 F.3d at 211 (noting initial effective date for disability
payments).
99. See id. (noting revised effective date).
100. See id. (noting amount of back payment awarded).
101. See id. (noting Trustee's refusal to award interest to Fotta on his disability
payments).
102. See id. (noting Fotta filed suit).
103. See id. (noting decision of district court).
104. See id. (reviewing Fotta's appeal). Judge Sloviter authored the opinion to
which Judge Scirica joined, and Judge Alito wrote a concurring opinion. See id. at
210, 215.
105. See id. at 214 (creating cause of action for interest under ERISA for
delayed pension payments).
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cuit initially noted the novelty of the issue presented in this case, both in
the Third Circuit and among the several circuits. 10 6 In deciding that in-
terest is available on delayed benefits without litigation to recover the pay-
ment, the Third Circuit interpreted ERISA's provision permitting "other
appropriate equitable relief" to include this independent cause of action
for interest. 1°7 In reaching its decision, the Third Circuit relied on several
factors including: 1) Congress' silence on whether interest is available is
not dispositive; 2) as a policy matter, interest should be available; 3) inter-
est is not extracontractual in nature; and 4) interest is equitable in nature,
and ERISA provides textual support for awarding equitable relief.10 8
1. Silence Not Dispositive
The Third Circuit rejected the Trustee's argument that ERISA's si-
lence on whether interest may be awarded for a delay in payment was dis-
positive in this case.10 9 Precedent establishes that Congress intended
federal courts to develop a body of federal common law to refine ERISA as
to remedies available under the Act.'1 0 The court reasoned that recogniz-
ing this cause of action would be a proper exercise of its power to develop
the law of remedies under ERISA because of the similarity between this
interest and prejudgment interest.1 11 The Third Circuit previously recog-
nized in Schake and Anthuis that a plan beneficiary could seek prejudg-
ment interest despite no express provision permitting it in ERISA.112
106. See id. at 211 (stating appeal raises issue of first impression).
107. For a continuing discussion of this holding, see infra notes 105-32 and
accompanying text.
108. For a discussion of these factors, see infra notes 109-30 and accompany-
ing text.
109. See Fotta, 165 F.3d at 211-12 (rejecting argument that ERISA's silence
bars interest recovery).
110. See id. (rejecting argument that because Congress did not explicitly pro-
vide for cause of action on delayed benefits payments it is not available under
ERISA); see also Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 56 (1987) (stating that
Congress intended for judges to develop body of federal law "to deal with issues
involving rights and obligations under private welfare and pension plans") (quot-
ing 120 CONG. REc. 29,942 (1974) (statement of Sen. Javits)); Bollman Hat Co. v.
Root, 112 F.3d 113, 118 (3d Cir. 1997) (stating that development of federal ERISA
common law is appropriate only when "necessary to fill in interstitially or otherwise
effectuate the statutory pattern enacted in the large by Congress"), cert. denied, 118
S. Ct. 373 (1997).
111. See Fotta, 165 F.3d at 212 ("It is of considerable moment that we have
previously recognized that a beneficiary may seek prejudgment interest in a suit to
recover benefits due, notwithstanding the lack of an express directive from Con-
gress to that effect."). For a discussion of the Schake and Anthuis cases, in which the
Third Circuit recognized a cause of action for prejudgment interest, see supra
notes 46-58 and accompanying text.
112. See id. (noting Third-Circuit recognition of prejudgment interest claims
under ERISA). The Third Circuit noted that the Anthuis decision is particularly
important for the recognition of general power to award prejudgment interest be-
cause ERISA explicitly provides for its award in a defined area of cases, i.e., delin-
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Thus, statutory silence alone did not bar recognizing the cause of
action. 
113
2. Extending Preudgment Interest Rationale
The Third Circuit used the Schake and Anthuis holdings as a basis for
the proposition that interest could be awarded despite ERISA's silence.' 1 4
More importantly, however, the court used the similar policy justifications
between prejudgment interest and interest on delayed payments to sup-
port its finding that, as a policy matter, interest should be recoverable. 115
The court cited two policies furthered by an award of prejudgment
interest, and it reasoned that these policies would be furthered by an
award of interest on delayed payments even without litigation establishing
entitlement to the benefits. 1 6 First, the court noted that a claimant can-
not be made whole because a "late payment effectively deprives the benefi-
ciary of the time value of his or her money whether or not the beneficiary
secured the overdue benefits through a judgment as the result of ERISA
litigation."" 7 Second, the court held that "unjust enrichment principles
also apply with equal force."" 8 The court reasoned that in the absence of
a cause of action for interest, plan administrators may be tempted to delay
payment and to retain interest that rightfully belongs to the beneficiary." 19
quent employer contributions under 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (g)(2)(B) (1994). See id.
(discussing Anthuis decision).
113. See id. at 211.
114. See id. at 212 (noting Third Circuit jurisprudence recognizing prejudg-
ment cause of action under ERISA).
115. See id. ("The principles justifying prejudgment interest also justify an
award of interest where benefits are delayed but paid without the beneficiary's
having obtained ajudgment."). For a discussion of the underlying policy justifica-
tions of prejudgment interest, see supra notes 21-26 and accompanying text.
116. See id. (noting prejudgment interest policy concerns to "mak[e] claimant
whole and prevent[ ] unjust enrichment"). The United States District Court for
the Western District of Pennsylvania, subsequent to Fotta, aptly noted that "the
Fotta decision does not prioritize these justifications and each of them can yield a
different interest award." Holmes v. Pension Plan of Bethlehem Steel Corp., No.
CIV.A.98-CV-1241, 1999 WL 179794, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 24, 1999). If the main
purpose is to give restitution, then the measure should be the benefits the plain-
tiffs actually lost by not having the money. See id. If, in contrast, the main purpose
is to deter unjust enrichment, then disgorgement of what the defendants actually
earned on the withheld money is the proper measure. See id. at *3. These meas-
ures may differ, and a court will balance the equities in determining which policy
rationale is most appropriate for each particular case. See, e.g., id.
117. Fotta, 165 F.3d at 212. For a discussion of why a claimant is arguably not
made whole without an award of interest, see supra notes 21-26 and accompanying
text.
118. Id.
119. See id. (theorizing about financial incentive that may result from contrary
holding); accord Hizer v. General Motors Corp., (Allison Gas Turbine Division),
888 F. Supp. 1453 (S.D. Ind. 1995) (upholding right to pursue interest on delayed
benefits).
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3. Interest Not "Extracontractual Damages"
Although the Third Circuit reasoned that interest should be available,
the court needed to rebut an argument attempting to bar its recovery.
The district court in Fotta relied on the Supreme Court's Russell decision
that barred extracontractual damages under ERISA. 120 The Third Circuit
addressed this argument in two ways. First, it confined the Russell holding
to bar extracontractual damages to the specific enforcement provision at
issue in that case-not the "other appropriate equitable relief" provi-
sion. 12 1 Second, and more importantly, the court held that claims for in-
terest are not "extracontractual" as intended by the Russell Court.122 The
court held that the interest sought in this case was compensatory in na-
ture, and Supreme Court precedent regards interest for late payment as
"an implicit part of a contractual obligation to pay money." 12 3
4. Interest as "Other Appropriate Equitable Relief"
The Third Circuit went on to characterize the awarding of interest as
an equitable remedy.' 2 4 It then reasoned that this cause of action is per-
mitted under the provision providing for "other appropriate equitable re-
120. See Fotta, 165 F.3d at 213 (noting that district court relied on Russell case
to deny interest). For a discussion of Russel see supra notes 39-42 and accompany-
ing text.
121. See id. (noting Russell did not address whether extracontractual damages
may be sought under 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (a)(1)(B) (1994)).
122. See id. (noting that Fotta is not seeking consequential or punitive dam-
ages, but rather compensatory interest).
123. Id. The Supreme Court has held that interest is an implied incident of a
contract. See Osterneck v. Ernst & Whinney, 489 U.S. 169, 175 (1989) (stating that
"prejudgment interest traditionally has been considered part of the compensation
due plaintiff'); Spalding v. Mason, 161 U.S. 375, 396 (1896) ("Every one who con-
tracts to pay money on a certain day knows that, if he fails to fulfill his contract, he
must pay the established rate of interest as damages for his nonperformance.
Hence it may correctly be said that such is the implied contract of the parties.").
124. See Fotta, 165 F.3d at 213. The Third Circuit cited to its own jurispru-
dence on interest. See id. In the prejudgment interest area, the Third Circuit held
that interest is "given in response to considerations of fairness and denied when its
exaction would be inequitable." Anthuis v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 971 F.2d
999, 1009 (3d Cir. 1992); see Liberty Lincoln-Mercury v. Ford Motor Co., 134 F.3d
557, 574 (3d Cir. 1998) (noting that prejudgment interest is equitable remedy
under NewJersey law); Hughes v. Consol-Pennsylvania Coal Co., 945 F.2d 594, 616
(3d Cir. 1991) ("When deciding whether to award prejudgment interest to a party,
a court must consider 'whether countervailing equitable considerations militate
against such a surcharge.'") (quoting American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Kosan, 635 F.
Supp. 341, 346 (W.D. Pa. 1986)).
The Third Circuit rejected the argument that equitable relief only involves
injunctions. See Fotta, 165 F.3d at 213-14. Money damages when viewed as restitu-
tion to remedy unjust enrichment are "widely, if not universally, regarded as a tool
of equity." Id.; see, e.g., Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers, Local 391 v. Terry, 494
U.S. 558, 570 (1990) (stating that money damages are considered equitable when
"they are restitutionary").
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lief" under ERISA.125 Although the Supreme Court cautioned against
"engraft[ing] a remedy on a statute," 126 the Third Circuit remained confi-
dent that the equitable nature of this cause of action-fully compensating
a beneficiary for the time value of money-falls under the "other appropri-
ate equitable relief' provision, despite the congressional silence. 12 7 The
Third Circuit simply viewed its decision as creating federal common law to
effectuate the objectives of ERISA.128 In conclusion, the Third Circuit
noted that, because this is an equitable remedy, all equitable defenses,
125. See Fotta, 165 F.3d at 213 ("Fotta's claim for interest is appropriately
raised under Section [1132 (a)(3)(B)], the civil-enforcement provision relating to
equitable relief."). Fotta invoked two of ERISA's civil enforcement provisions as
justification for awarding this interest. See id. at 211 (invoking 29 U.S.C. §§ 1132
(a)(1)(B) (1994) and 1132 (a)(3)(B) (1994) as textual basis for interest claim).
The first provision generally provides plan beneficiaries with the right to sue to
recover benefits under an ERISA-govemed plan. See id. This subsection states in
relevant part, "A civil action may be brought.., by a participant or beneficiary...
to recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan [or] to enforce his
rights under the terms of the plan ... ." § 1132 (a) (1) (B). The second provision
permits a plan beneficiary "to obtain other appropriate equitable relief' to redress
violations of ERISA or to enforce any provision of ERISA or the terms of the bene-
fit plan. See Fotta, 165 F.3d at 211 (noting Fotta's argument based on § 1132
(a) (3) (B)).
126. Massachusetts Mut. Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 145 (1985); see Mer-
tens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 254 (1993) (noting Supreme Court's "unwill-
ingness to infer causes of action in the ERISA context, since that statute's carefully
crafted and detailed enforcement scheme provides 'strong evidence that Congress
did not intend to authorize other remedies that it simply forgot to incorporate
expressly.'" (quoting Russel4 473 U.S. at 146-47 (emphasis in original)).
127. See Fotta, 165 F.3d at 214 (noting that this remedy falls within ERISA
provision providing for "other appropriate equitable relief").
128. See id. (citing authority to develop ERISA common law). The court
noted that ERISA requires courts to define the proper remedial scope of its provi-
sions. See id. (noting interpretative power); see also Russel4 473 U.S. at 157 (Bren-
nan, J., concurring) ("ERISA was not so 'carefully integrated' and 'crafted' as to
preclude further judicial delineation of appropriate rights and remedies; far from
barring such a process, the statute explicitly directs that courts shall undertake
it."); Teamsters Pension Trust Fund of Philadelphia & Vicinity v. Littlejohn, 155
F.3d 206, 208 (3d Cir. 1998) ("In a situation where the statute does not provide
explicit instructions, it is well settled that Congress intended that the federal courts
would fill in the gaps by developing, in light of reason, experience, and common
sense, a federal common law of rights and obligations imposed by the statute.").
One commentator has severely criticized the pro-active role of courts in creat-
ing federal common law under ERISA. See Brauch, supra note 38, at 543 (criticiz-
ing courts claiming to be filling gaps in ERISA and arguing that "the only gap is
between ERISA as it is written and ERISA as the courts wish it has been written").
This commentator warned:
When courts create federal common law interpreting plan terms and cre-
ating defenses to congressionally specified remedies, they are effectuating
Congress's choices. But when courts create new federal common-law
claims or remedies omitted from ERISA by Congress, they are effectuat-
ing their own choices .... Congress, not the federal courts, is in the
better position to make these policy choices. Congress, not the federal
courts, is directly accountable to the people.
Id. at 604-05.
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such as laches, will apply. 129 In addition, the court emphasized that inter-
est is "presumptively appropriate when ERISA benefits have been
delayed." 13
0
5. Concurrence
In a concurring opinion, Judge Alito emphasized that the law of trusts
could also provide a foundation for the equitable relief sought in this
cause of action. 13 1 In addition, he seemingly departed from the majority
opinion by noting that plaintiffs are entitled to interest as "appropriate
equitable relief' only when they prove that the "trustees violated the plan by
failing to pay ... benefits on time."1 32
IV. PRACricAL APPLICATION
A. Significance of Fotta
Fotta is a watershed development in the Third Circuit's ERISA remedy
jurisprudence.1 33 Because it recognizes a new cause of action, counsel
129. See Fotta, 165 F.3d at 214 ("And like other equitable remedies, it is subject
to equitable defenses such as laches."). Laches is an equitable defense barring
claims where the equities in a case counsel against allowing the claim to succeed.
See 27A AM. JUR. 2D Equity § 199 (1996) (defining laches). The lapse or nonlapse
of the statutory period of limitations is one factor, albeit not a decisive one, to be
considered under the doctrine. See generally Gardner v. Panama R. Co., 342 U.S.
29, 30-31 (1951) ("[T] he matter [of laches] should not be determined merely by a
reference to and a mechanical application of the statute of limitations."); Russell v.
Todd, 309 U.S. 280, 293 (1940) (finding that statute of limitations does not apply
when remedy is exclusively equitable); Meade v. Pension Appeals & Review
Comm., 966 F.2d 190, 195 (6th Cir. 1992) (holding that laches did not bar action
to collect disability benefits under terms of ERISA-governed pension plan where
claim was brought within most analogous state statute of limitations period and
where prejudice was not shown).
130. Fotta, 165 F.3d at 214.
131. See id. at 215 (Alito, J. concurring) (citing to hornbook law and caselaw
on trusts as support for this decision). This conclusion is significant because one
commentator has noted that:
[G]iven Congress's reliance on trust law in establishing ERISA's fiduciary
duties and its decision to limit relief to equitable relief, the legislative
history [while inconclusive as to remedies intended by Congress] is at
least consistent with the notion that such remedies consist of those avail-
able at common law for breach of trust.
Lopez, supra note 35, at 346.
132. Fotta, 165 F.3d at 215 (Alito, J. concurring). For a discussion of the sig-
nificance of Judge Alito's emphasis that the "trustees violated the plan," see infra
notes 148-53 and accompanying text.
133. See Timothy J. Snyder, Court Determines Interest is Payable on Delayed Benefit
Payments, 4 No. 2 DEL. EMPLoy. L. LETrER 4 (Feb. 1999) (noting newness of cause
of action). One practitioner in the area noted:
If you are like me, you have probably stuck to the belief that interest is
not payable on the delayed payment of benefits from an . . . (ERISA)
benefit plan. Well, the Third Circuit has shattered that myth in what the
court has characterized as a case of first impression ... not only in the
Third Circuit but in all federal circuits.
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should be ready to use it to their clients' advantage.1 3 4 In addition, be-
cause an interest award can be substantial, counsel for plaintiffs and de-
fendants should litigate the issue.
13 5
The Third Circuit established a presumption that its courts should
award interest.13 6 The court's decision, however, seemingly only affects
pension plans that are silent as to whether interest is available on delayed
payments.13 7 Thus, carefully drafted pension plans can solidify the award-
ing of interest or negate the presumption by providing that it is not avail-
able.13 8 A reasonable rate of interest may also be set in the plan. 13 9
Because this cause of action is independent from underlying litigation
on the merits establishing entitlement to ERISA-governed funds, the ten-
day, post-judgment motion limit articulated by the Supreme Court in Os-
Id. But see Brauch, supra note 38, at 541 (criticizing several courts' creation of
federal common law under ERISA as too extensive).
134. See Snyder, supra note 133, at *1 (opining "[t]his case opens the flood-
gates for litigation by anyone who believes that the payment of benefits has been
delayed").
135. See Robert B. Fitzpatrick, Damages and Other Remedies in Employment Cases,
SC08 ALI-ABA 895, 935 (June 17, 1997) (noting practical necessity of vigorously
advocating clients' interests); see, e.g., Hardtke v. Exide Corp., 821 F. Supp. 1021,
1031-32 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (awarding damages in the amount of $20,000.35 and
$6,799.32 in interest); GOTANDA, supra note 6, at 1-2 (noting that interest awards
can be substantial because of length of litigation or delays in establishing entitle-
ment to sum).
136. See Fotta, 165 F.3d at 214 (establishing presumptive right to interest on
delayed payments under ERISA-governed plans).
137. See id. at 211 (noting plan's silence on whether interest is available).
Although the court does not specifically address the Trustees' contention that "be-
cause . . . the plan [does not] expressly provide for the relief that Fotta seeks,
Fotta's claim must fail," it implicitly rejects the argument with its holding. Id.
138. See, e.g., Scott v. Central, Southeast & Southwest Areas Pension Plan, 727
F. Supp. 1095, 1098 (E.D. Mich. 1989) (holding that because pension plan is silent
on issue, interest is extracontractual and thus barred under Russell). Providing for
the award of interest in the pension plan itself will negate the arguments used by
the district courts characterizing this interest as extracontractual. See id. at 1095-
96.
139. See Hizer v. General Motors Corp., (Allison Gas Turbine Division), 888 F.
Supp. 1453, 1464 (S.D. Ind. 1995) (warning that rates built into pension plans
must be reasonable). The Hizer court noted in dicta:
Although not presented here, this analysis raises a practical question that
could be important to many plans: May benefit plans enforce plan provi-
sions that establish the interest rate or a method of calculation for delay
in payment of benefits? Generally, participants and beneficiaries of ER-
ISA plans will have no ability to bargain over plan terms. It would defeat
the policies of ERISA, for example, to allow a plan sponsor to embed in a
plan an artificially low interest rate for delay in payment of benefits.
However, the law usually favors a contractual solution over ajudicial one.
As long as plans adopt a reasonable way to calculate the interest.., then
it appears the plan terms should control the precise details of the
calculation.
Id. at 1464 n.8.
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terneck seems inapplicable.1 40 Other time constraints may, however, be
more noteworthy. The majority's indication that the equitable doctrine of
laches may bar recovery can be used by plan administrators attempting to
limit an interest award.1 4 1 The District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania interpreted the contours of the laches defense after the Fotta
decision. 142 In that case, the court noted that, under Pennsylvania law,
the laches defense normally follows the statute of limitations unless fraud
or concealment is shown. 143 It went on to hold that the appropriate stat-
ute of limitations is Pennsylvania's general six year period. 144 The court,
exercising its discretion, did not award interest on withheld money before
the six-year period, but did calculate it for money withheld within the stat-
ute of limitations period. 145 Although the laches defense may be relatively
straightforward, other contours of this momentous Third Circuit decision
seem less than clear. 14
6
140. For a discussion of Osterneck, see supra notes 57-58 and accompanying
text.
141. SeeFotta, 165 F.3d at 214 (noting that all equitable defenses attach to new
cause of action).
142. See Holmes v. Pension Plan of Bethlehem Steel Corp., No. CIV.A.98-CV-
1241, 1999 WL 124392, at *2 (E.D. Pa Feb. 5, 1999) (noting that Third Circuit
indicated that equitable defense of laches applies).
143. See id. (noting that tolling of statute of limitations will not occur unless
fraud or concealment by defendant is present); see also United Nat'l Ins. Co. v.J.H.
France Refractories Co., 668 A.2d 120, 124 (Pa. 1995) (articulating general Penn-
sylvania rule that laches follows statute of limitations unless fraud or concealment
is shown).
144. See Holmes, 1999 WL 124392, at *3 (deciding among several statute of
limitations options). The court noted that under 29 U.S.C. § 1132, there is no set
time limitation on bringing claims. See id.; see also Gluck v. Unisys Corp., 960 F.2d
1168,1179 (3d Cir. 1992) (noting absence of time limit). The Third Circuit noted
that three possible limitations periods exist under 29 U.S.C. § 1132. See id. at 1180-
81. First, Pennsylvania's Wage Payment and Collection Law, 43 PA. CONS. ANN.
§ 260.9 (West 1992), contains a three year limitations period. The court held that
delinquent pension payments are not sufficiently analogous to wage payments to
merit this time period. See Holmes, 1999 WL 124392, at *3. Second, there is a four
year statute of limitations for pension benefits that have not yet become payable.
See Gluck, 960 F.2d at 1181. The court found this rate inapplicable because the
pension benefits had already become due. See Holmes, 1999 WL 124392, at *3. Be-
cause these possible rates did not apply, the court defaulted to Pennsylvania's gen-
eral six year statute of limitations. See id. The statute of limitation is not, however,
always determinative of the laches period.
145. See Holmes v. Pension Plan of Bethlehem Steel Corp., No. CIV.A 98-CV-
1241, 1999 WL 179794, *1 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 24, 1999) ("[W]e also held that the
applicable statute of limitations precludes Plaintiffs claims for interest on deficient
pension payments that were made before March 9, 1992, six years prior to this
lawsuit's filing.").
146. See Snyder, supra note 133, at *1 ("One thing I am sure of: There will be
subsequent opinions from the Third Circuit regarding the payment of interest
from benefit plans.").
[Vol. 44: p. 807
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B. Unanswered Questions
1. Period of Accrual: Interest on All Retroactively Paid Benefits?
Similar to prejudgment interest, when a district court awards interest,
it must determine the accrual period. In this case, accrual could occur
from several points including from the beginning date of coverage or ret-
roactive payments, from when entitlement to the benefit or sum is legally
solidified or from the date within the applicable statute of limitations
under a laches defense. It is unclear whether interest should be presump-
tively available on all retroactively paid benefits even if payments are
delayed in accordance with the terms of an ERISA-governed plan. 14 7 For
example, interest may not be appropriate when a plan provides that a disa-
bility pension will not be payable until the Social Security Administration
(SSA) declares a participant disabled. 148 This situation is exemplified in
Fotta-interest accrual may begin at the rise of disability or at the point
that the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania upheld Fotta's rights to receive
disability payments. 149 A plan seemingly cannot be violated if its terms
require that administrative or judicial steps be taken prior to a beneficiary
being entitled to payments. Because the terms of the plan itself require
this process, retroactively paid benefits accruing from the inception of the
disability may not be "delayed" for purposes of this decision.1 50 Thus, de-
fining "delayed" is crucial, and some inconsistency may exist between the
majority and concurrence on this point.1 51
147. See id. at *2 (noting uncertain scope of Fotta's presumption of availability
of interest on delayed payments under ERISA).
148. See id. at *2 (providing example when interest arguably will not be avail-
able under Fotta).
149. For a discussion of the discretion exercised by district courts to set ac-
crual dates, see supra notes 59-65 and accompanying text. Presumably, the district
courts will exercise discretion in setting the accrual date, similar to the prejudg-
ment interest arena. The lack of clarity in this opinion, however, may result in
courts expanding or restricting the Third Circuit's ruling depending on which
date is used. For example, if the Third Circuit intended for interest to accrue on
any delayed payment, then Fotta would be entitled to, absent any laches defense,
interest running from the rise of the disability in 1984. See Fotta, 165 F.3d at 210.
In contrast, if the Third Circuit intended for interest to accrue only when the
terms of the plan are violated, interest would accrue only after the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania upheld his claim for disability-from 1997 on. See id. (noting deci-
sion to uphold disabled status).
150. See id. at 210-11 (noting that once disability is shown, entitlement to pay-
ments will be retroactive to date of inception of disability, but that this situation
may not constitute "delayed" payments as intended by Third Circuit).
151. Compare Fotta, 165 F.3d at 214 ("We therefore hold that a beneficiary of
an ERISA plan may bring an action for interest on delayed benefits payments
under section [1132] (a) (3) (B) of ERISA, irrespective of whether the beneficiary
also seeks to recover unpaid benefits."), with id. at 215 (Alito, J., concurring) ("If
the plaintiff in this case can establish that the trustees violated the plan by failing to
pay his benefits on time, an award of interest would constitute 'appropriate equita-
ble relief.'") (emphasis added). The concurrence seems to be either clarifying the
majority's holding or attempting to restrict it to instances where the terms of the
plan are violated. See Snyder, supra note 133, at *2 (noting concurrence may be
19991
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The concurring opinion's emphasis that the trustees "violate[ ] the
plan" may be viewed as clarifying the reach of the majority opinion, which
fails to mention such a restriction or as attempting to restrict its reach.
1 52
If the policy justifications cited by the majority, however, are to be taken
seriously, a plaintiff may be denied full compensation and the fund may be
unjustly enriched even if the terms of the plan itself necessitate delay in
payment due to administrative action or tangential litigation. 153 Practi-
tioners should use the uncertainty created by this decision to further their
clients' positions until the Third Circuit clarifies its holding.
2. Rate of Interest
In addition to the ambiguity regarding the accrual period, the Third
Circuit did not suggest an interest rate to be awarded in this new cause of
action. 15 4 District courts, similar to the prejudgment interest area, will
exercise discretion in fixing the rate.1 55 Because of the Fotta court's em-
phasis on the similarity between this interest and prejudgment interest,
district courts within the Third Circuit may opt to award the rate they
would award for prejudgment interest. 156
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Penn-
sylvania took this approach after Fotta.157 The court awarded restitution
interest at the prejudgment interest rate-in this case, it selected the
postjudgment rate under 28 U.S.C. § 1961.158 Because the § 1961 rate
fluctuates, however, "the complexity of different interest rates ... makes
the computation ... unworkable." 159 The court thus averaged the appli-
clarifying extent of holding). One commentator has opined that the language of
the concurrence stating that the trustees must "violate[ ] the plan," suggests that
interest may not be presumed appropriate in cases of retroactive interest awards
when the delay is in accordance with the terms of the plan. See id. (interpreting
concurrence).
152. See Fotta, 165 F.3d at 215 (Alito, J., concurring) (stating that if plaintiff
can prove trustees violated plan by failing to pay benefits on time, then plaintiff
will have cause of action); see also Snyder, supra note 133, at *2 (opining that con-
currence seems to clarify extent of majority's decision).
153. See Fotta, 165 F.3d at 212 (citing policy justifications for decision). For a
more thorough discussion of the policy justifications underlying prejudgment in-
terest and interest on delayed payments, see supra notes 21-29 and accompanying
text. For a discussion of the conflict between the two policy justifications, see supra
note 116.
154. See id. at 214-15 (failing to address rate of interest).
155. See id. at 214 (remanding for district court to exercise discretion to award
interest and to set rate).
156. For a discussion of the prejudgment rates employed by district courts
within the Third Circuit, see supra notes 68-73 and accompanying text.
157. See generally Holmes v. Pension Plan of Bethlehem Steel Corp., No.
CIV.A.98-CV-1241, 1999 WL 179794 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 24, 1999) (applying analysis
similar to that used in prejudgment area).
158. See id. at *3.
159. Id. For the text of 28 U.S.C. § 1961, see supra note 20.
[Vol. 44: p. 807840
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cable § 1961 rates.160 Moreover, the court awarded simple interest, calcu-
lated daily and compounded yearly, which accrued from the first reduced
payment until the date of its opinion.1 6 1 Because the Third Circuit, how-
ever, has never adopted an official rate and there exists a circuit split on
appropriate interest rates,1 62 practitioners should argue for the federal
postjudgment rate, the state rate or a prevailing market rate-whichever is
more favorable to their clients' pecuniary interests.' 63
CONCLUSION
The fate of this new cause of action is not certain. 164 In the interim
before final resolution of its availability, the Third Circuit and its district
courts may round out the contours of the Fotta decision, and practitioners
160. See id. Other courts also use this averaging method. See, e.g., Ford v.
Uniroyal Pension Plan, 154 F.3d 613, 619 (6th Cir. 1998) (using averaging
method); Webb v. GAF Corp., 949 F. Supp. 102, 108-09 (N.D.N.Y. 1996) (same);
Pierce v. American Waterworks Co., 683 F. Supp. 996, 1001-02 (W.D. Pa. 1988)
(same).
161. See Holmes, 1999 WL 179794, at *4. Note that postjudgment interest may
accrue from the date of thisjudgment. For a discussion of the common law rules
that developed in reference to compound and simple interest, see supra note 16.
162. For a discussion of the Third Circuit and other circuit approaches, see
supra notes 68-78 and accompanying text.
163. See, e.g., Slater v. Texaco, Inc., 506 F. Supp. 1099, 1115-16 (D. Del. 1982)
(noting rate of prejudgment interest is within discretion of court and should be set
with regard to particular circumstances of case); N.J. CT. R. 4:42-11 (a) (ii) ("For
judgments not exceeding the monetary limit of the Special Civil Part at the time of
entry... the annual rate of interest shall equal the average rate of return, to the
nearest whole or one-half percent, for the corresponding preceding fiscal year ter-
minating on June 30, of the State of New Jersey Cash Management Fund (State
accounts) as reported by the Division of Investment in the Department of the
Treasury"); NJ. CT. R. 4:42-11 (a) (iii) ("[F]or judgments exceeding the monetary
limit of the Special Civil Part at the time of entry . . .at the rate provided in
subparagraph (a)(ii) plus 2% per annum"); 41 PA. CONS. ANN. § 202 (West 1992)
(setting legal rate of interest in Pennsylvania at 6% per annum); American Enka
Co. v. Wicaco Mach. Corp., 686 F.2d 1050, 1057 (3d Cir. 1982) (holding that
under Pennsylvania law, prejudgment interest is awarded at statutory rate [6%]
from date cause of action arose). For example, the amount in interest recovered
can be great, depending on the rate employed. See, e.g., Smith v. American Int'l
Life Assurance Co. of New York, 50 F.3d 956, 957 (11th Cir. 1995) (awarding pre-
judgment interest at state rate of 12% as opposed to federal rate set at 3.54%).
164. This Casebrief did not aim to analyze the merits of the Fotta decision, but
rather aimed to explain the current state of the law in the Third Circuit. It should
be noted, however, that several courts have criticized this decision. See Kerr v.
Charles F. Vatterott & Co., No. CIV.A.98-1677, 1999 WL 493996, *6 (8th Cir. July
12, 1999) (stating, "To the extent that Fotta may be read to allow recovery of inter-
est as extracontractual or consequential damages, we respectfully disagree with
that holding" and denying interest on payments delayed three and one half years);
Walsh v. Eastman Kodak Co., 53 F. Supp. 2d. 569, 574-75 (W.D.N.Y. 1999) (noting
Third Circuit decision, stating "no evidence that any similar rule has been
adopted" in the Second Circuit exists and denying interest for 25-day delay).
Moreover, this split in authority combined with recent criticism of the creation of
federal common law may prompt parties to seek review in the Supreme Court of
the United States.
35
Bach: ERISA - The Awarding of Interest as Other Appropriate Equitable R
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1999
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44: p. 807
in this area should follow these cases and the cases in other courts regard-
ing this issue closely.
165
M. Stacey Bach
165. Other courts may help explain the reach of Fotta. Subsequent to the
Third Circuit's decision, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that a
plan participant who received all accumulated funds could not recover additional
interest amounts under ERISA. See Kerr, 1999 WL 493996, at *1 (denying interest
on payments delayed three and one half years). The Eighth Circuit held that the
Supreme Court limited recovery under § 1132(a) (3)-the "other appropriate eq-
uitable relief" section-to "classic equitable remedies such as injunctions, restitu-
tionary, or mandamus relief, and does not extend to compensatory damages." Id.
at *4 (citing Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 256-58 (1993)). The court
noted that arguments regarding notions about the underlying policy of ERISA can-
not supplant § 1132's express language. See id.
The court entered a discussion regarding whether the availability of interest
on delayed payments is restitution or compensation. See id. The court noted that
restitution may be equitable or compensatory. See id. The court focused on
whether the defendant actually made gains that can be disgorged or whether the
defendant was unjustly enriched as opposed to whether an interest award would
fully compensate the plaintiff. See id. The Third Circuit, however, cited both ratio-
nales in its opinion. The Eighth Circuit, in contrast, limited its reading of Fotta to
permitting interest awards as equitable restitution when they disgorge the interest
earned by the plan in the delay. See id. at *6. If the Eighth Circuit rationale is
followed, recovery may depend simply on whether the defendant did, in fact,
gorge benefits, and the availability of the cause of action may depend on the char-
acterization of the claim as unjust enrichment to the defendant.
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